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Abstract 
 Since the 1999 coronation of King Muhammed VI, Morocco has undergone large-scale 
changes in terms of legal reform via the nation’s Islamic family and personal status laws (the 
Mudawwana), gendered social roles and gender equality, and accepted modes of feminist 
political engagement in public space.  This rapidly shifting sociopolitical landscape has raised 
questions among Moroccan and international observers alike as to the efficacy of the nation’s 
protest culture in light of the regime’s cooptive power. This thesis looks to contemporary hip hop 
in the music of Fnaire and MC Soultana to present a more cohesive picture of Moroccan 
feminism, political dissent, and engagement with the regime in the early twenty-first century.  I 
frame my analysis in the work of cultural theorist Stuart Hall, who proposes that expressions of 
popular culture should not be considered monolithic entities of resistance or compliance, but as a 
landscape on which these concepts are explored and contested (Hall 1981, 227).  Examined in 
this light, the sometimes contradictory messages and behaviors that have marked much 
contemporary Moroccan political engagement and oppositional expression in recent years can be 
understood as a lens through which to view larger ideas about state engagement, feminism, and 
the construction of gendered social space. 
I do not understand hip hop musicians as part of a singular collective whose music and 
artistic output can be analyzed as either expressions of popular dissent unendorsed by the regime 
and thus valued as genuinely oppositional, or as the monarchically endorsed voice of regime 
cooptation.  Instead, drawing on the work of ethnomusicologist Cristina Moreno Almeida 
(2013), I examine hip hop groups and emcees as socially and politically active individuals whose 
music, lyrics, and music videos reflect their own creative agency as well as larger sociopolitical 
forces (Almeida 2013, 320).  By examining the output of two popular artists deeply engaged 
with gendered political expression, I demonstrate the ways that musicians work within and 
reflect the contemporary landscape of Moroccan feminism, political resistance, and 
reconstructions of gendered identities, all while working with, through, and around the regime’s 
cooptive power. 
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Notes on Transliteration 
 The following document contains words and phrases in both Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA) and Moroccan colloquial Arabic, or Darija. Darija is a primarily unwritten Arabic dialect 
that differs considerably from standard Arabic in pronunciation and spelling.  For this reason, I 
have adopted separate transliteration methods for MSA and Darija. When using Modern 
Standard Arabic terminology, I have followed the transliteration system used by the 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. When words or phrases are in Darija, I have 
written them phonetically or as they are transliterated by the Moroccan authors and artists in 
question. For example, the rap group Fnaire does not adopt the IJMES system when 
transliterating their name. Thus, throughout the following document Fnaire appears as seen on 
the ensemble’s website and other publications. 
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Introduction 
 
Through an examination of contemporary Moroccan hip hop music as a vehicle for social 
commentary, the ongoing contestation of gendered public space as legally codified in the 
Mudawwana, in this thesis I explore the changing relationship between feminism, protest, and 
the Moroccan monarchy from the early 2000s to the present.   I do not understand hip hop 
musicians as part of a monolithic entity whose music and artistic output can be analyzed as either 
expressions of popular dissent unendorsed by the state and thus valued as genuinely oppositional, 
or as the state-endorsed voice of regime cooptation.  Rather, following ethnomusicologist 
Cristina Moreno Almeida (2013) I examine individual hip hop groups and emcees as active 
social agents whose music, lyrics, and music videos reflect their own creative agency as well as 
larger sociopolitical forces (Almeida 2013, 320).  By examining the output of two popular artists 
deeply engaged with gendered political expression, I demonstrate the ways that musicians work 
within and reflect the shifting landscape of Moroccan feminism, trends of political resistance, 
and the regime’s cooptive power.   
Specifically, I am interested in the ways that the gendered subjectivities of musicians 
inform their political positions and vice versa.  Gender and questions of gender equality have 
played an important role not only in the recent political uprising of 2011—coined the 20 
February Movement, or 20M—but in the contemporary Moroccan political climate at large.  The 
nation’s Islamic Law of Personal Status, the Mudawwana, has been a vital tool of both the 
monarchy and oppositional feminist activists.  Despite its role in providing the king with grounds 
for religious legitimation, it has also served as a rallying point for those engaged in the fight for 
political change.  Though it was officially abolished in 2010, vestiges of the Mudawwana remain 
a powerful social force that, according to gender studies scholar Samia Errazzouki, has helped to 
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encourage new forms of gendered political expression and resistance throughout the past decade 
(Errazzouki 2014, 260). 
Moroccan hip hop is a relatively new musical practice that has only recently garnered the 
attention of musicologists from the United States and Europe, as well as from Morocco and 
throughout North Africa.  Kendra Salois’s 2009 dissertation from the University of California at 
Berkley is one of the first studies of hip hop’s large scale sociopolitical impacts in twenty-first 
century Morocco.  She presents the genre in tandem with the nation’s rapid adoption of 
neoliberal economic policies since 2000, and examines artists’ navigation, reinforcement, and 
subversion of these policies and their resultant socioeconomic impacts.  Similarly, Cristina 
Almeida Moreno’s 2013 article examines hip hop artists’ musical and political economy through 
their interactions with state economic apparatuses and modes of production.  Finally, Moroccan 
cultural studies scholars Taieb Belghazi and Said Graiouid approach hip hop and metal music in 
terms of their involvement with or disengagement from regime influence in large scale music 
and cultural festivals. I hope the present study will provide a starting place for the consideration 
of audience members and artists’ gendered subjectivities along with these important factors.  By 
considering hip hop music and gender alongside Mudawwana reform and developments in legal 
and social institutional frameworks, this thesis offers an alternative lens through which to view 
developments in both Moroccan popular music and oppositional culture. 
Feminism in Law and in Practice 
The coronation of Morocco’s King Muhammad VI in 1999 marked the beginning of a 
period of rapid political change as the modes of governmental engagement available to citizens 
expanded.  The nation’s previous monarch, Hassan II, had imposed strict penalties against critics 
of his administration, penalties that included fines, imprisonment, and in some cases, torture or 
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execution (Smith and Louidy 2005, 1075).  Muhammad VI’s ascent to the throne put an end to 
the “Years of Lead” experienced during the reign of his father by permitting open expression of 
political dissent through both oppositional political parties in parliament and politically active 
NGOs.  In 2001, under heavy domestic and international pressure, the King led a commission to 
reform the nation’s constitution and hotly debated family and personal status laws, ushering in 
over a decade of dramatic sociopolitical unrest and change. 
Based in the Maliki School’s interpretation of Islamic law as revealed in the Qur’an and 
Sunna, the Mudawwana has historically stood apart from the secular practices and policies that 
dominate other facets of the Moroccan penal code.  In addition to its origins in Islamic legal 
thought, personal status and family law deals explicitly with conduct in the private spheres of 
marriage, divorce, and the family, and has thus been the focus of Moroccan feminist and Islamist 
groups alike.  Serious debate about the content and applicability of the original draft of the 
family and personal status law began as early as 1979, but the oppressive political climate under 
the nation’s first two monarchs made large-scale reforms difficult.  It wasn’t until 2001, under 
the auspices of King Muhammad VI, that the Mudawwana entered the realm of public debate.  
After a period of intense, widespread campaigning by political parties and NGOs on both sides 
of the issue, the King conceded to demands to amend both the Mudawwana and the Moroccan 
constitution. These changes were met with international accolades, and at the time of their 
implementation in 2003, both the amended constitution and the Mudawwana were considered 
among the most progressive political documents in the region by Western observers (Smith and 
Louidy 2005, 1070).   
Skeptics of the new constitution and personal status laws claimed that they represented 
only a superficial change and kept the problematic underpinnings of monarchical power—the 
4 
 
King’s role as Commander of the Faithful (amīr al-mūminīn)—fundamentally unaltered.  For the 
various feminist organizations that had campaigned for political and legal change during the past 
two decades, the maintenance of this royal position further ensured that their relationship with 
the government remained unchanged.  In an article exploring recent developments in Moroccan 
feminist thought, Zakia Salime characterizes this relationship as one of state collaboration rather 
than outright political resistance (Salime 2012, 103).  Despite constitutional and legal assurances 
of equality and freedom, the King’s role as Commander of the Faithful creates a highly 
hierarchical system that often prevents truly equitable freedom of expression for individuals or 
organizations espousing views outside those endorsed by the monarchy.   
This has led to the recent emergence of alternative modes of feminist expression in 
conjunction with 2011’s 20 February Movement.  As the so-called Arab Spring protests1 
expanded from their origins in Tunisia across the rest of the Maghreb, Moroccan citizens took to 
the streets and the Internet to demand further reforms to the constitution and the Mudawwana.  
The 20M denied any direct political affiliation, choosing instead to present itself as a loosely 
organized coalition without an explicit, unifying ideology.  While this lack of a clear goal or 
leader made criticism of the movement by its opponents somewhat easier, it also created a 
climate of ideological openness.  It is in this openness that Salime locates the impetus of 
Morocco’s “new feminism.”  Members of the 20M tend to avoid the direct engagement with the 
monarchy that characterized efforts by most established feminist NGOs and political parties, 
choosing instead to incorporate gender equality into a larger message of social justice through 
both symbolic and physical parity of men and women in the Movement’s activities (Salime 
2012, 106).  Not only does this speak to a new form of political activism, it also indicates a 
                                                          
1
 I use the terms Arab Spring here with the understanding that it serves as a generalizing phrase for what were highly 
specific and often localized sociopolitical events rooted in regional history and local concerns as well as larger 
global political currents. 
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change in the perception of gendered bodies and the ways in which these bodies occupy similarly 
gendered public spaces. 
Gendered Bodies on Musical Display 
In the following chapters, I examine the work of Fnaire and MC Soultana in conjunction 
with these changing notions of gendered political engagement.  Hip hop in Morocco has been 
incorporated into the nation’s large music festival industry since the 1990s, but the genre’s 
association with cultures of resistance and political dissent has come to dominate international 
depictions of Moroccan artists.  For many Moroccans, however, the growing visibility of hip hop 
in the national and international media is a source of tension (Almeida 2013, 320).  While some 
musicians are legitimated through their inclusion in state-sponsored TV and festival events, 
others remain marginalized, facing censorship from television and radio, fines, and even 
imprisonment.
2
  This uneven endorsement of musicians and their works has aroused suspicions 
that the King and his regime ultimately hold sway over the expressive conduits of the hip hop 
industry.  As many musicians rely on state-sponsored festivals and royal patronage in order to 
gain widespread recognition and, ultimately, professional success, such criticisms are not without 
merit. 
Even so, Moroccan hip hop’s association with political protest in the international market 
has been more or less cemented largely through the efforts of Western media outlets in the 
aftermath of the 2011 protests.  For many artists, the reality of their political positions is much 
more complicated.  Far from being vessels of either pure social resistance or monarchical 
cooptation, Moroccan hip hop musicians play an active role in the ongoing contestation of public 
space, governmental legitimacy, and definitions of citizenship.   An expanded analysis of these 
                                                          
2
 Moroccan hip hop artist El-Haqed was sentenced to two years in jail in 2011 and received another four-month 
sentence this year. 
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artists’ often complex sociopolitical positionings is necessary to engender an understanding of 
hip hop music in North Africa that both shapes and is shaped by local social forces.  In her 2009 
dissertation on Moroccan hip hop artists and neoliberalism, Kendra Salois writes  
… [A] balanced vision of hip hop studies can and should include inquiry into 
expressions that support, are indifferent to, or try and fail to change existing 
inequalities in their home communities.  An understanding of agency respectful of 
the full spectrum of interpretations and beliefs held by individuals will 
acknowledge the efficacy of both those moves which liberate and those which are 
complicit with existing hegemonic practices, even as it teases them apart. (Salois 
2009)  
 
The understanding of artistic agency expressed in the present study reflects Salois’s description.  
Hip hop musicians discussed in the following chapters both reaffirm and reject certain discourses 
of both monarchical legitimacy and gendered social roles.   
By tracing feminine and feminist representations in the lyrics and music videos of two 
prominent artists from the early 2000s to the present, my analysis reveals not only the complex 
and often-overlooked strategies through which musicians navigate systems of royal patronage 
and state control, but also underscores evolving notions of gender and their important role in 
contemporary political engagement.  Situating artists and their music within specific social and 
political contexts encourages a more nuanced depiction of both the Moroccan hip hop scene and 
the politically and socially engaged actors therein (Almeida 2013, 319).  
Cultural studies theorist Stuart Hall argues in his 1981 article “Notes on Deconstructing 
‘The Popular’” that forms of popular expression should not be considered as either traditions of 
resistance or of compliance, but rather as “the ground on which [these] transformations are 
worked” (Hall 1981, 228). Considered in this light, hip hop becomes a valuable tool with which 
to understand the shifting and contested ground of both feminism and regime legitimacy. In 
examining two case studies separated by roughly a decade of large-scale sociopolitical changes, 
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my project illuminates some of the ways that transformations, to borrow Hall’s term, take place 
in the ongoing struggle for gendered social and political spaces. These artists do not speak for a 
homogenized Moroccan “public,” but the resonance and relevance of their expressions is 
witnessed in their continued popularity and their inclusion in state-sponsored national and 
international music festivals.    
Fnaire is an all-male rap group that first achieved widespread popularity in 2003 with 
their celebrated musical response to the Casablanca terrorist attacks of the same year.  Generally 
recognized as a pro-monarchy ensemble, Fnaire provides an important case study due to their 
relationship to regime rhetoric surrounding both the growing women’s movement of the early 
twenty-first century and the government’s dramatic anti-terrorist measures in the wake of the 
2003 bombings.  In visually and verbally joining these discourses, the group also links 
monarchical legitimation via the king’s protective role as amīr al-mūminīn and the increasing 
presence of women and women’s bodies in the public sphere.  That the ensemble is all male and 
performs in a male-dominated genre provides an interesting parallel to the dominant monarchical 
discourse in which the protection of both female and national well-being—the former through 
the Mudawwana and the latter through strict anti-terrorism law—lies chiefly in the domain of the 
king. 
Placing the work of Fnaire in dialogue with contemporary artist MC Soultana illuminates 
a dramatic shift in the perception of gendered political economy and public space.  The men of 
Fnaire rap about women and the nation as undifferentiated categories under the allegedly 
equitable (male) protection of the monarch.  MC Soultana, in contrast, is a woman speaking 
about the experiences of individuals in conjunction with their unique sociopolitical realities.  
While she does not claim any explicit political allegiance or goal, MC Soultana’s work reflects a 
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recent shift in the ways that Moroccan citizens, particularly women, engage with issues of 
economic, social, and political inequality.   
Western media outlets have tended to discuss both MC Soultana and Fnaire within the 
somewhat limiting framework of traditional feminist opposition against regime totalitarianism 
and discrimination (Stuckey and MC Soultana 2014).  Cast in this light, musicians’ lack of clear 
political affiliation, along with a willingness to participate in state-sponsored television and 
festival events might contribute to analyses of contemporary Moroccan protest culture as 
ineffective against monarchical cooptation.  Examining hip hop music in dialogue with 
sociopolitical developments and changes in feminist thought, rather than viewing either 
phenomenon in isolation, challenges such assessments and may indicate a slightly more 
optimistic trajectory for Morocco’s political future.     
Chapter Summary 
 In this study I will first explore the evolution of the Mudawwana and state-endorsed 
feminism in conjunction with Fnaire’s musical output of the early 2000s.  Then, following the 
work of Salime, I will discuss more recent developments in feminist and protest culture 
surrounding the 20M as it informs the work of MC Soultana. The chapters ahead will attempt to 
further illuminate the relationship between Moroccan feminism and regime opposition, hip hop 
music and musicians, and the regime itself.  
Chapter 1 will provide a summary of recent reform efforts in Moroccan personal status 
and family law as they relate to the developing feminist movement.  Islamic law is a concept and 
a term fraught with both academic and social baggage.  The Mudawwana has also had a lasting 
impact on the construction of gendered social spaces and women’s roles therein.  It is thus 
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imperative to understand the law’s development and symbolic significance in order to better 
grasp the rhetoric and actions employed by Moroccan feminists and their opposition.   
I begin my analysis of the Mudawwana with a brief exploration of Sharī’a law and its 
significance in the post-colonial Maghreb through the work of the legal historians and 
anthropologists Mounira Charrad, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, and Pinar Ilkkaracan.  The symbolic 
significance of family and personal status law throughout the Arab world has often hinged on its 
role in shaping cohesive postcolonial identity as well as its perceived religious authenticity. This 
is not to argue that an analysis of the Mudawwana should be divorced from Islamic practice, but 
that the law’s social and political roles often exist in realms related to but distinct from the 
religious.  An exploration of the sociopolitical history of Sharī’a law in practice helps paint a 
more thorough picture of Islamic law in its specific contexts and may dispel some of the 
associations with which the term is occasionally saddled.  
 I then move to a discussion of personal status and family law’s significance in the 
gendering of Moroccan space and bodies, and its impact on monarchical legitimation.  Despite 
considerable revisions since its inception in the mid-twentieth century, the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Morocco (CKM) and, by extension, the Mudawwana continue to endorse the 
monarch’s semi-divine position as the Commander of the Faithful. When coupled with much of 
the language present in Morocco’s family and personal status law, the king’s role as amīr al-
mūminīn works to strip women of their agency as citizens.  The nation becomes gendered as 
female, while men maintain dominance in a majority of public spaces. Delving into the king’s 
role as Commander of the Faithful and the reinforcement of gendered public and political spaces 
helps to illuminate the somewhat limited modes of engagement available to feminist 
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organizations and thus better explains some of these organizations’ perceived failures in their 
engagement with the state apparatus.  
 Finally, the opening chapter concludes with a brief historical overview of reform efforts 
from 1992 to 2004.  This period was vital to establishing a political climate that allowed for the 
flourishing of previously censored musical and political activities.  I will focus especially on the 
period following Muhammad VI’s 1999 coronation as a pivotal moment in Moroccan political 
history.  The ascendance of the current monarch to the throne marked a transition in the methods 
of state legitimation and control from forceful authoritarianism under Hassan II to a less overt 
method rooted largely in the manipulation of expressive symbols.  It is this transition that, in 
part, made the politico-musical reflections discussed in this work possible. Situating the 
sometimes overlapping, sometimes contradictory perspectives of artists, activists, and regime-
supporters within this legal and political history offers a clearer view of the ongoing 
sociopolitical work occurring therein.   
 Chapter 2 focuses on the music of Fnaire and its relationship to the pivotal political 
moment following the May 2003 terrorist attacks on the city of Casablanca. The first task of this 
chapter is to more firmly situate hip hop as a global musical form in the specific local context of 
early twenty-first century Morocco. Though the global interconnections influencing and 
influenced by this musical practice are somewhat tangential to this particular project, hip hop’s 
significance as a global musical practice should not be overlooked. Many Moroccan musicians 
use musical and visual signals associated with hip hop culture in the United States and the West 
more generally, but the activation of these tropes often comes to signify specific local meanings.   
In framing my analysis, I combine Stuart Hall’s theory of popular culture as a site of 
contestation with the work of art history scholar Amanda Rogers, and Moroccan political 
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scientist Mohammad Daadaoui. Both Rogers and Daadaoui discuss the monarchy’s usage of 
cultural and institutional symbols as tools for legitimation.  Though Rogers focuses on visual 
symbols and Daadaoui on sociopolitical institutions, I believe an analysis of music and musical 
discourse has much to contribute to this discussion. Fnaire uses a series of visual and lyrical 
tropes that, according to Rogers’s previous analysis, support regime rhetoric through the 
feminization of the nation.  This in turn contributes to the discourse immediately following the 
Casablanca bombings that reinforced the regime’s legitimacy through appeals to the king’s 
patriarchal protection.   
However, I do not wish to suggest that Fnaire can be understood solely as a puppet of the 
monarchy whose musical expressions are dictated by regime-approved discourse alone.  The 
ensemble’s political statements in lyrics and visual expression sometimes run counter to their 
actions off-stage.  It is for this reason that I invoke Hall’s theory of expressive media as 
contested social space.  Rather than place Fnaire’s musical output within the resistance-
cooptation dichotomy, I understand the ensemble’s work as indicative of larger currents of 
gendered political engagement in Morocco around the turn of the twenty-first century. 
My third and final chapter turns to an artist working nearly a decade later.  MC Soultana 
is one of the first female rappers in Morocco to enjoy widespread popular success since the 
launch of her solo career in 2010.  Her first single, “Sawt Nissa” (“Voice of Women”), 
represents a distinct shift away from established modes of feminist opposition and expression 
discussed in the preceding chapters.  By putting this work in dialogue with recent political 
protests that began in 2011, as well as with developments in the nation’s growing festival 
industry, I aim to present a clearer depiction of contemporary feminist opposition and hip hop’s 
place within it. 
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Like Fnaire, Soultana’s actions offstage often seem to contradict the sentiments expressed 
in her music.  Her participation in regime-sponsored music festivals and lack of open support for 
the oppositional movement complicate her depiction as a musical symbol of women’s dissenting 
political voices.  In order to unpack these contradictory images and better understand MC 
Soultana’s multi-faceted relationship with both contemporary protest culture and the state 
apparatus, I will examine music festivals and royal patronage as changing symbols of regime 
cultural policy.  Like the contemporary opposition, large-scale festival events capture a wide 
array of performers and audience members, and typically fail to conform to a single political 
message.  It is often difficult to determine where state control ends and the individual agency of 
festival participants begins, opening the events to multiple interpretations and contestation. 
      I will then examine Soultana’s 2011 hit, “Sawt Nissa” more specifically.  I treat this 
work as a case study in dialogue with both festival culture and emerging forms of feminist 
opposition.  Not only does it illuminate some of the changes occurring between contemporary 
feminism and that of the past, but tensions inherent in the song’s lyrics and performance evince 
ongoing contestation about women’s roles as politically active citizens.  Rather than considering 
Morocco’s new feminism and MC Soultana’s career in binary terms of success or failure, I am 
interested in what these tensions and contradictions imply in terms of the development and 
expansion of Moroccan citizenship and changing perceptions of regime legitimacy.   
What falls in the gaps between rhetoric and behavior often exposes more about the shape 
of sociopolitical life than either reveals when considered in isolation.  With its rich symbolic 
language and shared expressive space, music is a particularly fertile ground for this type of 
analysis.  Morocco’s political future is yet to be determined, but including socially and politically 
engaged hip hop in the conversation brings to light some of the nuances between monarchical 
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cooptation and popular oppositional expression that have become hallmarks of Moroccan protest 
culture in the twenty-first century.  By establishing a more thorough understanding of the ways 
that feminism, citizenship, and regime legitimacy are continually contested via expressive public 
space, my thesis presents a picture of contemporary feminism and protest that does not hinge on 
the limiting, and often discouraging binary framework of state-endorsed expressions and those 
which are read as genuinely oppositional.   
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Chapter One 
 
The Moroccan Mudawwana:  
Monarchical Authority and Legal Reform in Family and Personal Status Law 
 
Since the mid-twentieth century, Moroccan feminism and its counter discourses have 
been heavily influenced by the nation’s Islamic family and personal status laws, or the 
Mudawwana.  The monarchical government often used the laws and their religious origins as a 
source of political legitimation, while anti-regime and feminist activists have repeatedly seized 
on the Mudawwana and its various reforms as a vehicle for reassessing the construction of social 
space and gender roles. As such, the document is often a tacit presence in discussions of 
Moroccan gendered social organization and oppositional culture whose impacts are witnessed 
but not always openly acknowledged.  With this chapter, I aim to bring the impacts of Maliki 
Islamic law and the Mudawwana to the foreground.  The history and development of Islamic law 
in Morocco makes it a fundamental part of contemporary sociopolitical life, and many of the 
challenges faced by early feminist groups are reflected in contemporary political engagement 
among hip hop musicians.  While I do not propose that the concerns of these temporally and 
distant groups are identical, the social impacts of Islamic law both in theory and in practice 
continue to resonate into the present day and are a necessary part of a fuller understanding of 
contemporary opposition and gendered social life in the Moroccan hip hop community.    
The original draft of the Mudawwana was implemented in 1957, shortly after Morocco 
gained national independence from French colonial powers.  The original document featured a 
nearly wholesale adoption of the historical legal interpretations of the Maliki School of Islamic 
legal thought, including highly conservative rulings such as the maintenance of male 
guardianship (jabr), polygamy, strict limitations placed on divorce enacted by the female spouse, 
and the male right to unilateral repudiation of marriage (ṭalāq).  From its implementation to its 
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official abolition in 2010, the Mudawwana influenced not only the social construction of gender 
and its expressions, but also the very fabric of monarchical power and legitimacy.  
 In this chapter, I will trace the social and legal repercussions of the Mudawwana and 
numerous reform efforts from 1957 to 2004, with a particular focus on the changes implemented 
under the nation’s current leader, King Muhammad VI.  Politically engaged actors ranging from 
feminist activists to regime supporters continuously employ the language and gendered 
understandings codified in Morocco’s family and personal status law.  Alterations in legal policy 
are reflected in the nation’s activist culture and vice versa.  Thus, it is necessary to grasp the 
sociopolitical significance of the Mudawwana, as well as its contested history in order to more 
fully understand the varying perspectives of politically engaged musicians discussed in coming 
chapters.  
 I will first situate family and personal status law in the larger context of Islamic legal 
history and social practice in order to avoid the troubling generalizations that sometimes emerge 
in discussions of Sharī’a law.  Like most social institutions, Moroccan Islamic law did not 
emerge in isolation but was the result of complex historical forces and continuous legal and 
social interpretation.  By exploring the historical context in which it is embedded, I hope to 
provide a more thorough examination of the law and its sociopolitical impacts.  I will then 
discuss the ways that the Mudawwana has shaped understandings of gender and gendered social 
space. This in turn informs the emergent relationship between forms of feminist activism and the 
regime.  Finally, I will provide a brief overview of recent reform efforts, beginning in 1992 and 
culminating in the law’s major 2004 reforms.   
The Mudawwana in Islamic Legal and Social Practice 
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 The historical purpose of articulating an Islamic legal code was to align the practices of 
the Muslim community with interpretations of God’s divine law (the Sharī’a) as expressed in the 
Qur’an.  Theological understandings of the Sharī’a recognize it as sacred and immutable 
instruction revealed through the Prophet Muhammad for the purpose of illustrating the path to 
eternal salvation for both individuals and their faith community, but it poses unique problems in 
terms of legal codification and practice.  Much of the Sharī’a outlined in the Qur’an deals with 
internal morality and piety, which lie beyond the domain of positive law. Early Islamic legal 
scholars distinguished between aspects of the law concerned with an individual’s relationship 
with God and an individual’s relationships with others.  The former was considered a matter of 
divine judgment, while the latter could be organized into formal legal code through scholars’ 
interpretive efforts.  This distinction created an ongoing division in Islamic law between divine 
ideals and social practice.  Though the Sharī’a is understood to present an ideal model of human 
social life, the level of interpretation required of its textual medium leads to social and legal 
practices necessarily influenced by human reasoning.    
Contemporary Islamic legal systems exist at an intersection between these historically 
situated interpretation and the supreme, atemporal authority of God’s word as manifested in 
authoritative texts (the Qur’an and Sunna).  On one hand, law in Islam stems directly from 
revelation and is removed from human influence; yet it also exists in an ongoing dialogue with 
centuries of legal interpretative tradition and social practice.  These two elements of Islamic law, 
described by legal anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hosseini as the “sacred” and the “temporal,” are not 
entirely dichotomous and the boundaries between them are seldom clear or fixed (Mir-Hosseini 
1993, 1).  As the Qur’anic text remains continuously open to interpretation, its legal 
manifestations cannot be considered in isolation from extant socio-historical influences or 
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individual biases of scholars. This makes the source of authority in Islamic legal structures 
somewhat ambiguous, as tensions exist between the ultimate authority assigned to the divine 
texts and the potentially flawed human judgment exercised by scholars in their interpretation and 
codification of the law (Abou El Fadl 2003, 3-4). 
Yet for many in the Maghreb and the larger Muslim world, family and personal status 
law’s particular significance lies in its perceived connections to authoritative Islamic sources.  
The Qur’an and Sunna—the collected writings on the Prophet’s life and teachings—are most 
vocal about rules concerning personal conduct in family and marital relationships.  Family and 
personal status law is therefore the most developed and encompassing branch of Islamic legal 
practice, and principles espoused in these doctrines are often said to most closely represent the 
word of God as transmitted through the Prophet Muhammad. This poses particular legal and 
religious challenges to reformation efforts as discourse surrounding the legal doctrines often 
conflates the practice of the law with belief in God’s divinity and Islam (Charrad 2001, 28).  
Family and personal status law also maintains symbolic importance through its historical 
links to local resistance against Western colonial oppression.  The colonial period saw the 
relatively widespread rise of secularism throughout the Muslim world through the formation of 
colonial governments closely resembling their counterparts in the West. This governmental 
model generally relegated religious practice to private spheres of interaction and severely limited 
the presence of Islam in governance.  Those engaged in the fight for Moroccan independence 
often related this reduction of Islam’s social influence to Western subjugation, thus imbuing 
Islamic law with increased symbolic value.   
Mir-Hosseini argues that family and personal status law not only served as symbolic 
resistance to secularization and local disempowerment, it also created a space in which Islam 
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could retain its practical legal significance.  As the behavior regulated by personal status and 
family law lies in the private sphere—namely within the home, family, and the female body—it 
was generally exempt from the largely public rise of secularism. It therefore retained practical, as 
well as symbolic importance in the lives of many Moroccan Muslims.  This double-layered 
significance, which ties family and personal status law to both sociopolitical identity and 
perceived religious authenticity, has helped these legal doctrines retain their significance in the 
face of large-scale social changes throughout the postcolonial period in Morocco.  
Despite longstanding claims of religious and social authenticity, family and personal 
status law in Morocco and elsewhere has been subject to many of the same interpretive efforts 
and socio-political considerations as other legal branches, and often represents a hybrid between 
Sharī’a rulings and secular jurisprudence based on Western models (Mir-Hosseini 1993, 10-11).  
Many contemporary scholars and activists are currently engaging with family and personal status 
law through the discourses of feminism and human rights in attempts to situate these legal 
interpretations in their appropriate socio-historical contexts, and to provide alternative readings 
of the Qur’an in terms of gender roles and social equality.  In Morocco, recognition of personal 
status law as a document susceptible to human influence and human failings allowed the 
Mudawwana to enter the political arena as a vital source of sociopolitical resistance and early 
feminist expression.  
The Mudawwana as an Expression of Gendered Bodies and Gendered Space 
The Mudawwana’s social legacy is most readily observed in conceptions of the gendered 
organization of space and embodied social roles. Personal status and family law historically 
served the social purpose of regulating sexual conduct in order to prevent morally degenerate 
social discord, or fitna.  Early perceptions of human sexuality in the Muslim philosophical and 
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legal traditions often assigned it a neutral moral value: sexuality represents instincts which are 
neither inherently good nor inherently damaging.  Rather, the actions undertaken in the name of 
such instincts determine their benefit or harm to society (Mernissi 2000, 19). In her article “The 
Muslim Concept of Active Female Sexuality,” well-known Moroccan feminist author Fatima 
Mernissi locates contemporary perceptions of sexuality and gender relations in the writings of 
Imam al-Ghazali, a highly influential medieval Sunni legal philosopher.  In his writings, Al-
Ghazali described sexuality as a divine creation to assure humankind’s continued existence.  As 
such, sexual desire cannot be eradicated or suppressed entirely, but instead must be carefully 
controlled in order to better serve God’s divine purpose. 
According to Mernissi, sexual desire’s status as both divine and earthly, and its “tactical 
importance in God’s strategy,” requires divinely inspired regulation (Mernissi 2000, 21).  In 
ideal circumstances, this divine regulation stems directly from the divine instructions elaborated 
in the Qur’an and Sunna, though in reality, social considerations have often equaled 
interpretations of the divine texts in terms of legal significance.  Mernissi argues that Islamic 
legal interpretations tend to operate on the basis of women’s sexuality as an active, rather than 
passive force.  Women are portrayed as seeking out the fulfillment of their sexual urges, as 
opposed to serving as passive recipients of male desire.  This understanding historically 
necessitated more active forms of social control, such as practices of female seclusion, in order 
to prevent sexually driven chaos in which women’s sexual desires undermine the male-
dominated social order.  It is also worth noting that this conception of female sexuality and its 
social and legal ramifications played a large role in the formulation and justification of the 
Oriental imaginary in the West.  In this context Muslim women’s sexuality was not only seen as 
potentially dangerous for their own communities, but also for the Western social structure as 
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European men were depicted as especially susceptible to the sexual allure of the haremed 
woman.  
Much jurisprudential literature on women’s roles in marriage focuses on the fulfillment 
of male desire as a means through which to disempower the potentially subversive and 
dangerous sexual needs of the female spouse.  Restrictions placed on women’s rights in 
marriage, such as the legal permissibility of unilateral divorce via repudiation, work to reinforce 
this hierarchical understanding of gender relations in which women trade absolute sexual 
availability in exchange for financial and material support. Though reforms of personal status 
and family law in Morocco have gradually decreased the focus on total sexual availability 
present in the Mudawwana’s earliest articulations, this initial legal interpretation helped to 
transform women from active political subjects into inanimate, politicized objects.  The early 
Mudawwana’s treatment of female sexuality and bodily autonomy as a force to be contained and 
controlled has created a larger political climate in which women are often invested with deep 
sociopolitical significance in exchange for their social agency (Maher 1978, 101).  In addition to 
placing wives in a sexually subjugated position, family and personal status law’s symbolic value 
during the struggle for independence further encouraged the perception of women and their 
bodies as the bearers of Moroccan culture whose roles as wives and mothers superseded their 
rights as citizens and individuals.    
The Mudawwana legally codified a rigid distinction between the public sphere, which is 
the domain of men, and the female-gendered private sphere.  This gendered public/private 
dichotomy emerges as both an abstract sociopolitical concept and a physical reality.  Although 
neoliberal restructuring of the Moroccan economy has both allowed and necessitated the 
introduction of women into the workplace, they are often still depicted in popular culture as 
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residing almost exclusively in the home and their domestic duties retain significant moral value 
(Rogers 2012, 457).  Men, on the other hand, are able to symbolically and physically leave the 
home to enter the socially active space of the political and economic public.  According to 
Fatima Sadiqi and Moha Ennaji in a 2006 article on the feminization of Moroccan public space, 
“this view associates the public space with outside/exterior and the private space with the 
inside/interior, implying that the outside is the place of power where social constraints are 
produced and the inside is the place where this power is exercised” (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2006, 89).  
Ennaji and Sadiqi not only recognize male social power in the public space, but they also 
acknowledge the ways that family and personal status law works to translate that power to 
female-dominated private spaces.  Many of the most important events in men’s lives occur in 
private, and the legally sanctioned rights to polygamy, unilateral divorce, and sexual availability 
historically allowed men to manage women’s personal as well as public behavior (Ennaji and 
Sadiqi 2006, 91). 
Women’s dominant presence within the home as mothers, wives, and culture-bearers thus 
worked to socially silence them and encourage a legal and political environment in which 
women are spoken for rather than spoken to.  As such political disempowerment is embedded in 
the configuration of Moroccan social space via the Mudawwana, it has proven difficult for 
activists to overcome, especially when placed in dialogue with other social factors such as ethnic 
and class identity.  In the decades following the ratification of the first Moroccan constitution, 
feminist organizations tended to focus their efforts on Mudawwana reform as a means to combat 
this marginalization.  Engagement with the dominant legal and political discourse allowed these 
women to assert themselves into the distinctly male-dominated political space.  
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 In an article exploring recent developments in Moroccan feminist thought, gender 
studies scholar Zakia Salime characterizes the emergent relationship between early Moroccan 
feminist activists and the regime as one of halting collaboration rather than outright political 
resistance. From its earliest iterations in the mid-twentieth century, mainstream Moroccan 
feminism has been characterized by its relationship with the monarchy.  Rather than working 
outside the established structures of social and political power, activists work within these 
systems and often employ similar religious and political language.  While this strategy initially 
allowed for increased visibility of the movement and created the possibility of legal reform, it 
also inadvertently reinforced the monarch’s authority (Salime 2012, 103).  In engaging directly 
with regime rhetoric and acknowledging the Mudawwana’s significance as a source of religious 
legitimacy, state-endorsed feminist organizations set a standard of sociopolitical resistance 
dependent on the monarchy for recognition and legitimation.   
Early Feminism and the Solidification of Monarchical Power 
During the colonial period, the women’s rights movement played an important role in 
working against French leadership by encouraging a counter-discourse to European 
understandings of allegedly retrogressive Islamist social policies.  Beginning in 1946 with the 
early feminist group, the Sisters of Purity, politically motivated women’s organizations came 
forward to challenge the validity of wholesale acceptance of Maliki jurisprudence in family and 
personal status law.  Along with nationalist and religious leaders these groups called for a 
reactivation of Islamic interpretative tradition (ijtiḥād), a practice in which the Sharī’a and its 
resultant legal codes become a constantly evolving system through continually informed 
interpretation of religious sources.  The concept of ijtiḥād was a valuable tool for the 
independence movement as it discouraged European interpretations of Islam as inflexible and 
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inherently static, and engendered a sense of empowerment among often socially disparate 
populations of Moroccan Muslims by highlighting a mode of resistance based in shared faith. 
Through public cooptation of religious language, early women’s organizations joined the issues 
of gender equality with the larger struggle for independence and national self-determination.     
After the formal usurpation of the French colonial government in 1952, the early 
postcolonial parliament appointed a group of Maliki legal scholars (‘ulemā) to codify formal 
family and personal status laws based on the Maliki juristic tradition.  No women were present 
on this parliamentary council, indicating a break between pre-independence discourse that 
included gender equality as a major symbol of nationalist identity, and the reality of fledgling 
nationhood in Morocco.  Concerns about the practical implications of the nation’s large ethnic 
diversity prompted efforts to unify disparate ethnic communities under the new monarchical 
government.  The original draft of the Mudawwana provided an effective means by which the 
monarchy could transform Islam into a unifying political tool.  
In her book, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Morocco (2001), Mounira Charrad demonstrates the powerful influence of kin-based social 
groupings on Morocco’s early legal development.  She argues that the relatively late acquisition 
of independence and the close alliances forged between semi-autonomous kin-based 
communities and the newly-formed Moroccan government helped to influence the interpretation 
and development of the laws of personal status.  She claims that, in formally codifying a 
relatively strict interpretation of Maliki law in the early Mudawwana, the Moroccan government 
helped to cement the patrilineal structure of existing kinship-based communities through the 
maintenance of hierarchical gender relations based on agnatic, rather than conjugal bonds 
(Charrad 2001, 100).  Through highly conservative legal rulings, this early draft of the 
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Mudawwana continued to define marriage and kinship as exclusively agnatic, and to deny female 
agency in either social or bodily actions. 
The strict codification of the Mudawwana also worked to cement the monarchy’s base of 
power.  Under the Moroccan constitution, the king fills the role of the Commander of the 
Faithful whose primarily responsibility is to unite the Moroccan people under the doctrine of 
Islam.  Within this role, the king is responsible for safeguarding the religious and moral well-
being of the nation and is appointed the guardian of the people’s rights and liberties as defined in 
the constitution.  This position effectively transfers the aegis of individual rights into the hands 
of the monarch.  Perhaps more importantly, the title of amīr al-mūminīn signifies the royal 
family’s right to rule as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and grants the royal regime 
political legitimation through an Islamic framework, a capacity denied to all other political actors 
(Smith and Louidy 2005, 1070-1071).
3
 The codification of a relatively strict interpretation of 
Islamic law allowed Morocco’s first king, Mohammad V, to not only gain support of powerful 
conservative religious factions immediately following independence, but also firmly positioned 
him as the nation’s guiding father-figure in the religious domain. 
This religiously legitimated authority has created a political environment in which any 
alternative discourse is easily construed as not only anti-regime, but also anti-Islamic and 
potentially threatening to the social order.  An article by cultural studies scholars Andrew Smith 
and Fadoua Loudiy discusses the relationship between expressions of dissent and the king’s 
position as amīr al-mū’minīn: 
[I]n an Islamic state such as Morocco … where the king’s legitimacy is linked to 
his being Commander of the Faithful … individual autonomy undermines the 
                                                          
3
 Any politicization of Islam by oppositional groups has frequently been painted as extremist and ultimately 
dangerous to the nation’s political stability, thus rendering a potentially powerful political tool exclusively into the 
hands of the monarch. 
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state that upholds the religion that the monarch invokes for sanctification and, 
ultimately, political legitimacy.  
 
Smith and Loudiy characterize the regime as a “semi-authoritarian system” in which the 
government uses ambiguity of permissive and prohibited acts in order to maintain an 
environment of self-censorship and inevitable regime cooptation of dissident political projects.  
Semi-authoritarian systems are not to be confused with failed democracies or transitional 
governments moving between totalitarianism and democracy.  Rather, they are controlled 
governmental constructs in which the status quo of regime power and cooptation is carefully 
maintained (Smith and Louidy 2005, 1070). 
For the Moroccan feminist movement, this system created a form of political and social 
resistance that was heavily reliant on the monarchy for success.  Rather than position themselves 
as direct opponents to the king and his regime, state-endorsed feminist groups worked as allies of 
the monarchy and often called on the king to act as arbitrator in their larger disputes with various 
Islamist political parties and activist groups.  As Zakia Salime explains 
These entitlements [of regime alliance] provide feminist groups with leverage to 
counter the power of the Islamists who could authoritatively speak in the name of 
God against painfully gained rights. This is why questioning the King’s authority 
is very risky for feminist groups […] (Salime 2012, 108) 
 
The historical necessity of a cooperative relationship between feminist organizations and the 
regime has often led critics of the mainstream feminist movement to paint its activists as puppets 
of the monarchy complicit in the government’s oppressive project (Errazzouki 2014, 262).4  An 
examination of contemporary Mudawwana reform efforts from 1992 to 2003 demonstrates the 
sociopolitical impacts of the often uneasy alliance between feminist resistance and monarchical 
                                                          
4
 Errazzouki points to the marginal status of working-class and rural women, and the failure of the new personal 
status code to engender any meaningful changes in the lives of many individuals outside the nation’s wealthy urban 
centers. 
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power.  A very similar relationship has developed between many Moroccan hip hop musicians 
and the regime through institutions of patronage and regime-sponsored music festivals.  The 
monarch’s role as amīr al-mū’minīn also stretches into the artistic realm as the nation’s 
government strives to position itself as a bastion of moderate monarchical Islam.  Cultural 
patronage and the shifting relationship between the hip hop industry and the regime will be 
discussed further in the coming chapters.    
Mudawwana Reform, 1992–2003: The Birth of Contemporary Moroccan Feminism 
Despite widespread dissatisfaction toward the Mudawwana’s first draft among many 
nationalist leaders, the oppressive political climate under the nation’s second monarch, King 
Hassan II, through the early 1980s prevented any large-scale reform movements from coalescing 
until late in the decade.  During the Years of Lead immediately following independence, the 
government resorted to increasingly violent methods to prevent public unrest and silence 
dissension from both secular and Islamist opposition.  Opponents of the regime faced penalties 
ranging from fees and formal reprimand to jail sentences and, in some cases, torture and 
execution.  International political pressure eventually forced a loosening of restrictions against 
free speech, and by the late 1980s several publications appeared directly linking questions of 
women’s rights and gender equality with larger human rights issues spurred on by the efforts of 
the United Nations.   
The gradual increase in publications calling for Mudawwana reform amounted to a 
widespread effort by the organization Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF), one of the country’s 
first major feminist NGOs, to publicly promote legal changes.  In 1992, the UAF published a 
petition in their magazine 8 Mars with the goal of obtaining one million signatures in favor of 
family and personal status law reforms, including acknowledgment of twenty-one as the age of 
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majority for women, the abolition of polygamy and unilateral divorce, and the right of women to 
pursue education and work outside the home without permission from a male guardian (Salime 
2009, 155).  The choice of a published text as a primary medium for major feminist 
organizations was an important one.  The primacy of text as a communicative tool narrowed the 
movement’s potential audience to an educated and elite segment of the general population, but it 
also forced the monarchy to respond in kind and publicly acknowledge feminist concerns for the 
first time.  While it has been argued that this ultimately worked to alienate feminist activists from 
a large part of the Moroccan public, it did achieve the important goal of forcing Islamic law, and 
the king’s religious authority along with it, into the arena of public debate (Sadiqi 2008, 329). 
The political climate of the 1990s in Morocco was one of cautious optimism and change 
as foreign pressure from Western economic allies resulted in increasing democratic freedom in 
the form of parliamentary elections.  This political environment helped encourage the success of 
the UAF petition: the document quickly achieved more than its goal of one million signatures in 
support of UAF’s proposed reforms.  However, a number of prominent Islamist groups 
simultaneously collected one million signatures opposing the UAF’s demands.  Tensions came to 
a head in a publication by a group of conservative religious leaders calling for the death penalty 
against UAF’s leaders as apostates from Islam.  In response to the crisis, King Hassan II issued a 
public statement in which he expressed his refusal to allow Islamic law into the public political 
struggle.  The monarch appointed a council of twenty men and one woman to work for carefully 
controlled reforms, including restrictions on polygamy through marriage contracts, the increase 
of the age of majority from fifteen to eighteen, and a lessening of the legal impacts of male 
guardianship on unmarried adult women. These reforms were passed into law the following year.  
However in accordance to the Moroccan Constitution, parliament was dissolved from late 1992 
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to early 1993 due to upcoming elections.  Thus King Hassan held all legislative power during 
this period and passed the reforms into law without the approval of any electoral body, despite 
promises of increased transparency and democratization of the reforms process (Buskens 2003, 
80).
 
 
The resulting changes to the Mudawwana were met with disapproval from both Islamist 
and secular organizations.  Many engaged in the struggle for increased gender equality felt the 
new draft did not go far enough in its reforms, as institutions such as polygamy and male 
guardianship in marriage were only amended rather than redressed outright, and the age of 
majority for women did not reach the intended twenty-one years of age.  Instead of undermining 
male-centric social institutions, the new version of the Mudawwana attempted to protect women 
and children against male abuses of these privileges.  Fears of fitna coupled with women’s status 
as sociopolitical symbols provided an impetus for maintaining male social control. For 
individuals involved in Morocco’s growing Islamist movement, these reforms fundamentally 
altered the social and legal position of the Maliki Islamic School, and therefore of Islam itself.  
Some groups threatened to act out violently in response to the new version of the Mudawwana. 
This encouraged new restrictions on freedoms of speech, and minor reforms were gradually 
enacted without incident.  
A major shift in Morocco’s political climate occurred in 1999 with the death of King 
Hassan II.  His son Muhammad VI assumed leadership of the nation shortly after his father’s 
death.  In both Morocco and the international community, Muhammad VI’s coronation was seen 
as a turning point in Morocco’s halting movement toward democratization.  For the first time in 
the nation’s history, socialist and Islamist political opposition was accepted into the official 
democratic process, and regime opponents were allowed to run openly in elections and hold 
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parliamentary seats (Pruzan-Jørgensen 2011, 235). Within this climate of increased political 
openness, the feminist movement and proponents of legal reform found new official avenues for 
encouraging change. In early 2000, Muhammad VI formally adopted a proposal authored by the 
socialist opposition party, Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS), in the form of the National 
Plan for Integrating Women in Development.  
The National Plan sought to address conditions of inequality between men and women 
across all levels of Moroccan society, including revisions to the Mudawwana and the national 
constitution. It received accolades from the international community and was considered 
exemplary in its reflection of UN standards of gender equality as elaborated by the UN’s 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in their 1995 
Beijing Platform for Action (Charrad 2012).  Questions still remained as to whether the practical 
implementation of the Plan would mirror the changes promised in its text, and if such changes in 
legal theory would amount to similar improvements in legal practice.  In an article published in 
Fez in 2004, prominent Moroccan political analyst Mohammad Tozy expressed his concerns that 
reform of personal status and family law would fail to alter fundamental social inequalities if it 
was not coupled with similar changes in access to education and employment.  That the National 
Plan did not address these flaws in the nation’s social infrastructure outright represents a pattern 
in contemporary Moroccan law reform.  Ongoing inequalities rooted in not only gender, but 
ethnic identity and social class, have created a widening gap between the theory of the law and 
its practice that remains a major stumbling block for reform efforts.   
The deep division the issue of family law reform opened in the populace became evident 
in a series of demonstrations in the country’s major cities throughout early 2003. Shortly after 
the National Plan’s proposal over one million people took to the streets of Casablanca in 
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opposition to the proposed changes, while in parliament the influential Islamist political party 
Parti del la Justice et du Developement (PJD) organized a national committee “for the protection 
of the Moroccan family” (Salime 2009, 160).  In what has become a widely used tactic by 
organizations and individuals opposed to potentially secularizing reforms to family law, the PJD 
attacked the proposed reforms as both anti-Islamic and anti-Moroccan.  The group claimed the 
reforms blatantly contradicted the Sharī’a while simultaneously representing Western cultural 
imperialism accessible only to the most elite segments of Moroccan society.  Such arguments 
illustrate the volatile intersection embodied in the Mudawwana between Islam as a national 
social force and the female body as a political symbol.  The rhetoric of reform opponents often 
conflated Moroccan citizenship with Islamic religious devotion and the subjugated status of 
women with social and moral stability.   
The struggle between these deeply opposed stances remained at a political stalemate until 
May 16, 2003, when a group of youths with alleged ties to al-Qaeda committed violent attacks 
against Casablanca.  The attacks and subsequent political backlash cast serious doubt on Islam’s 
place in political discourse and caused many citizens to express harsh criticism against both 
Islamist movements and the monarchy for their perceived failures at safeguarding the populace 
against religious extremism (Pruzan-Jørgensen 2011, 248).  For the regime, the 2003 bombing 
supported previous assertions that Islamic law did not belong in public political debate and was 
ultimately the domain of the monarch as Commander of the Faithful.  People once again took to 
the streets after May 16, but unlike demonstrations that occurred earlier in the year, the subject 
was not Mudawwana reform and increased gender parity in the public sphere. Rather, many 
citizens sought to demonstrate their commitment to national peace and unity against the 
allegedly external threats of terrorism and extremism.  These protests and their ongoing impacts 
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on feminist expression and popular musical culture will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter.    
With opposition to reforms severely weakened and the public relatively distracted, 
Muhammad VI formally implemented the changes to the Mudawwana and the constitution 
proposed in the National Plan in early 2004.  In the subsequent draft of Moroccan family and 
personal status law, women were considered legally equal to their husbands in matters of 
property rights and child custody, possessed nearly equal access to divorce, and were no longer 
required to obtain a male guardian’s permission prior to marriage.  The revised constitution also 
promised increased personal and public freedom regardless of gender, and its proponents 
claimed that it embodied a gradual move toward representational democracy. Recent history 
clearly demonstrates that the Moroccan feminist movement did not disappear, nor did the quest 
for increased social equality end after the implementation of the 2004 reforms. However, I 
understand the Casablanca bombings and the legal revisions that followed as a recent turning 
point in the struggle for gender equality whose effects continue to echo into the present day.   
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Chapter Two 
 
The Music of Fnaire: 
Moroccan Hip Hop Defining the Public Space 
 
 Hip hop group Fnaire’s “Ma Tqich Bladi” was one of the most popular songs in Morocco 
during 2003 to 2004, the turbulent period immediately following the Casablanca bombings. It 
appeared on Moroccan State Television (2M and 1 Med) and echoed in the streets during 
numerous anti-terror demonstrations. A decade later, the song’s music video remains readily 
available on YouTube, and the group’s 2003 album was released in its entirety on the music 
listening software Spotify. When placed in dialogue with its local context, the content and 
continued popularity of Fnaire’s song provides a strong argument for both its musical and 
sociopolitical relevance. Though it does not overtly comment on the ongoing contestation of 
gendered public space and the status of women in law and society, Fnaire’s work provides a lens 
through which important elements of these debates become apparent.  Looking ahead to the 
present, the social reflections embedded in “Ma Tqich Bladi” remain salient.  
Fnaire is commonly identified by both Moroccan and international music critics as a 
conservative, pro-monarchy rap group, but the exact meaning of this label proves somewhat 
elusive.  Though they engage indirectly with the regime and the Makhzen through participation 
in state-sponsored music festivals and concerts, they have also recently contributed to a number 
of independent projects intended to increase opportunities for young musicians outside the 
established royal patronage system (Almeida 2013, 328).
5
 In terms of artistic or musical 
patronage, Moroccan citizens and scholars commonly speak of their government as consisting of 
                                                          
5
 Patronage in the Moroccan context often assumes the role of the monarch himself or members of the Makhzen in 
funding a concert or musical festival. Events with this kind of support are sometimes considered suspect or counter-
productive by musicians, especially those engaged with social reform and oppositional efforts. Fnaire’s 
acknowledged participation in events deliberately outside this system complicates depictions of the band as 
thoroughly “pro-monarchy.”  
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two distinct spheres of operation. Taieb Belghzai and Said Graiouid, researchers at the 
University Mohammed V-Agdal in Rabat, characterize the regime as a “bicepheral organization” 
consisting of a modern political administration on the one hand, and the traditional Makhzen, a 
system of sociopolitical authority that includes the close entourage of the king as the effective 
center of power and control, on the other hand.  In some ways, Fnaire’s ambiguous political 
position between Makhzen patronage and more independent venues provides a particularly 
illuminating example of the complex web of interconnections between hip hop and the monarchy 
as the ensemble’s political ambiguity challenges ideas about the nature of popular musical 
expression and monarchical discourse as inherently dichotomous.  
But while I resist common depictions of the group as purely an instrument of regime 
cooptation, I also argue that the ways in which Fnaire’s musical rhetoric somewhat mirrors and 
reinforces that of the regime should not be readily dismissed.  If hip hop is understood as one of 
many arenas in which hegemonic “containment” and anti-hegemonic “resistance,” to borrow 
Hall’s terminology, compete for cultural capital in Morocco, then “Ma Tqich Bladi” provides a 
snapshot of this process as it played out between the monarchy and the growing feminist 
movement during the pivotal period following the Casablanca bombings (Hall 1981, 228).  
In order to better illuminate this contested expressive ground, I will first provide a brief 
overview of hip hop’s position within the larger Moroccan socio-musical context during the 
early 2000s. This period is often considered the beginning of a shift in regime policy toward 
speech rights and freedom of public expression under Muhammad VI. In broad terms, the turn of 
the twenty-first century in Morocco witnessed the burgeoning popularity of musical genres 
generally perceived as emanating from the West, including both hip hop and heavy metal. Fnaire 
was among many artists allowed access to public musical space for the first time through 
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inclusion in state-sponsored broadcasting and live festival events. Taken as a microcosm of 
larger political processes, artists’ negotiations in the popular music industry underscore the 
intense social currents working to shape and re-shape the structure of Moroccan civil society 
during the early 2000s. 
The regime’s public response to the 2003 bombings was replete with feminine and 
feminist imagery, and it is to this imagery that I will turn my attention. Following the work of 
Moroccan political scientist Mohammad Daadaoui, I examine the regime’s use of powerful 
social symbols as tools to maintain legitimacy and public stability during a period of intense 
social and political upheaval. That many of these symbols also carry strong feminine 
connotations and implicitly speak to women’s roles as culture-bearers and icons of Moroccan 
citizenship is indicative of the struggles and some of the perceived shortcomings of the state-
engaged feminist movement of the early twenty-first century. Despite considerable legal and 
political victories in the form of Mudawwana reform, the regime’s continued invocation of 
feminine symbols for legitimation speaks to Moroccan women’s ongoing quest for agency in the 
public and political spheres. 
The musical and visual output of Fnaire during this period intersects with these 
discourses.  Examining the ways that “Ma Tqich Bladi” musically, lyrically, and visually 
engages with the emergent hip hop community and official symbols of the regime’s patriarchal 
protection via feminine images and bodies illuminates the contestation occurring between modes 
of feminist resistance and governmental legitimation and cooptation. This calls into question 
Fnaire’s status as a monarchical puppet while at the same time recognizing the presence of 
regime influence on their music and music videos. Through an understanding of Fnaire’s 
position between state-engaged feminist resistance and monarchical cooptation, I hope to also 
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provide a platform for analyzing current debates about the future of feminism and feminist 
resistance in the Moroccan context.  Again invoking Stuart Hall, I will elaborate on the role of 
hip hop music and musicians as intermediaries in the ongoing struggle for increased democratic 
representation and gender equality in Moroccan sociopolitical life.   
Local Musical Forms on a Global Stage 
Rather than referring solely to a musical genre or style of lyrical delivery, hip hop in the 
context of this work encompasses the art forms, media outlets, and expressive communities 
surrounding this form of popular music.  More specifically, it refers to DJ-ing and turntabalism, 
rapping and emceeing, break dancing and other contemporary dance forms, graffiti art and 
writing, and a system of social knowledge uniting these modes of expression (Morgan and 
Bennett 2011, 176).
6
  Generally speaking, the development of contemporary hip hop as a form of 
political protest and source of community cohesion is located among minority youth 
communities on the east coast of the United States beginning in the mid-1970s.  In that context, 
the genre came to signify minority ethnic identity, especially that of African Americans, and 
heightened political awareness and activism related to an atmosphere of pervasive, 
institutionalized discrimination and inequality.  Much early hip hop was associated with calls for 
increased civil rights and worked to express frustrations of underprivileged urban communities 
and solidify community identity.  But, as with many globally recognized musical genres, the 
history and present musical and political trajectory of hip hop remains highly contested.   
It is not the intent of this chapter to comment on or contribute to that ongoing debate, nor 
do I intend to draw distinctions between allegedly “commodified” or “commercialized” rap and 
that which is depicted as politically and socially conscious, sometimes referred to as 
                                                          
6
According to Morgan and Bennett, “Hip-hop knowledge refers to the aesthetic, social, intellectual, and political 
identities, beliefs, behaviors, and values produced and embraced by its members, who generally think of hip hop as 
an identity, a worldview, and a way of life.” 
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“grassroots.”  These distinctions are often not as salient in the global context as they are when 
speaking about the American music industry, and can create a false dichotomy that ignores the 
complexities of artists’ intent and audience members’ interpretations. Borrowing from 
Marcyliena Morgan and Dionne Bennett’s broad overview of global hip hop, I understand the 
genre in its current context as an emergent community that “encourages and integrates 
innovative practices of artistic expression, knowledge production, social identification, and 
political mobilization. In these respects, it transcends and contests conventional constructions of 
identity, race, nation, community, aesthetics, and knowledge” (Morgan and Bennett, 177).  
Whatever its specific origins or sociopolitical role, hip hop’s contemporary place in the 
global music consciousness is undeniable.  In 2009 the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) reported that hip hop music made up half of the Top-10 songs 
digitally downloaded around the world.  Despite this worldwide presence, it is important to avoid 
exceedingly broad characterizations of hip hop culture across international, national, and 
regional boundaries.  The genre’s visual, musical, and aesthetic styles often signify different, 
locally specific sets of meanings that may fail to translate wholesale from one context to another.  
This is particularly true of stylistic elements often used to index black social and ethnic identity 
in the United States.  These signifiers do not always engender the same, often racialized 
representations in all contexts, and may indicate entirely different, regionally specific meanings 
to local audiences.  In her recent article “Rap and Revolt in the Arab World,” Nouri Gana warns 
of confusing the significance of rap music in the United States with its significance as a global 
movement.  In Gana’s words, “The development of rap music into a world-wide youth 
phenomenon should be seen as a result of intense circulations, exchanges, borrowings, 
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adaptations, hybridizations, and graftings of local forms of musical expression and cultural 
empowerment” (Gana 2012, 26).  The same can be said of hip hop culture more generally. 
Musicologist Murray Forman writes in his 2002 examination of hip hop and identity 
among Somali refugees in the United States that  
Claiming one’s place within Hip Hop culture involves more than simply 
exhibiting particular consumption patterns, sartorial tastes, or other surface 
gestures; it also encompasses the demonstration of deeply invested affinities or 
attitudinal allegiances that shape one’s mode of expression and inform the core of 
both self and group identity simultaneously. (Forman 2002, 102)   
 
In this sense, affinity for the genre as either a musician or audience member is often attached to a 
larger system of assumed values and life ways.  The precise significance assigned to these 
assumptions shifts as the music and practices associated with hip hop culture become embedded 
in new local contexts.  At the same time, such characterizations can be misleading.  In terms of 
the Moroccan hip hop industry, the assumption that all listeners and artists share similar political, 
social, or religious values may lead to an essentialized depiction of a diverse community.  Within 
American music journalism, such depictions are often based in a particular set of musical values 
and cultural assumptions that look to the development of hip hop in the United States as a basis 
for the genre’s sociopolitical significance elsewhere (Lakhani 2012).7   
Almeida challenges this conception of the Moroccan hip hop community.  Instead of a 
cohesive, unified group of political actors, she sees Moroccan hip hop musicians and audience 
members as primarily non-collective, with impressions of unity stemming from “fragmented but 
similar activities” rather than shared ideology or any semblance of organizational leadership 
                                                          
7
 This 2012 article for the American news outlet, CNN, provides one such example.  Though the association of 
contemporary hip hop artists and political protest is not incorrect, the constructed dichotomy between “grassroots” 
or “authentic” Moroccan musicians and their “commercialized” or “inauthentic” American counterparts assigns a 
system of musical values to Moroccan artists that may or may not resonate with their specific experiences, and tends 
to deny such musicians any engagement with the processes of the international music industry and commercial 
success offered therein. 
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(Almeida 2013, 323).  When examining the activities of individual artists or ensembles, this lack 
of collectivity becomes even more apparent as the actions and political expressions of even 
individual members of the hip hop community often fail to totally conform to a single 
ideological or political objective.  The following pages attempt to dissect this complex 
relationship between the emergent hip hop industry in Morocco, the nation’s monarchical 
government, and the members of Fnaire as independent socio-musical actors.     
“Stand up:” Nayda and the Birth of the Moroccan Hip Hop Industry 
As in its nascent phase of popularity in the United States and western Europe, hip hop 
music in the Arab world—and the Maghreb region more specifically—is often broadly 
associated with political unrest and periods of social change among youth populations.  
According Gana’s overview of Arab popular music, many of the earliest rap crews who gained 
popularity in the Arab world during the late 1990s and early 2000s focused their often deeply 
critical musical attention on the ongoing conflicts between Israel and Palestine. (Gana 2012, 31)  
This portrayal of the genre as a politically motivated mouthpiece of popular dissent made it a 
focus of the international media during the recent 2011 protests throughout North Africa and the 
Middle East.  Tunisian hip hop arguably received the most international attention during the 
2011 Arab Spring protests in the Maghreb due in part to the intense governmental reaction 
against Tunisian musician El Gèneral’s outspoken criticisms of the existing regime.  Hip hop 
culture in Morocco during this period, much like the Moroccan protests themselves, garnered 
comparatively little global media attention despite a strong national presence and impact. 
 In my view this overall lack of international interest in Morocco during the 2011 Arab 
Spring movements is due, in part, to the multifaceted relationship between Moroccan protest 
culture and music, and the regime.  Popular music and culture are often depicted by the 
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Moroccan and international media like as either engaged with the state and thus wholly 
commercialized, or as wholly noncommercial and disengaged from official state rhetoric. In this 
dichotomous framework, noncommercial musical expressions are often understood as unfiltered 
social and political ideations of a marginalized and disadvantaged population, while commercial 
music stems from governmental or elite cooptation of these expressions.  The social value 
attached to allegedly grassroots expressions of popular dissent has often engendered competing 
discourses of regime cooptation versus popular opposition both in the hip hop community and 
Moroccan protest culture more generally.  These discourses do not always reflect individual 
behavior or personal experience but carve out space in which artists and community members 
can explore and contest their often varying and variable positions.  Cristina Morena Almeida 
cogently argues that Moroccan hip hop artists occupy a medial social position, operating between 
rebellion and cooptation in order to navigate the complex socio-musical structure between 
popular culture, political protest, and monarchical legitimacy. Almeida states that even as some 
musicians “reproduce and seem to affirm certain state discourses, they can at the same time be 
involved in opening up public discourses in which to develop networks of solidarities. In this 
way they can create a strong rap scene that cannot be understood using the limiting framework of 
corrupt versus authentic” (Almeida 2013, 320).8  
 Hip hop artists’ negotiations between governmentally sanctioned rhetoric and extra-state 
popular expression has been a hallmark of the genre since it first achieved widespread popularity 
in Morocco during the early 2000s.  Muhammad VI’s ascendance to the throne in 1999 marked 
the beginning of a period of artistic and social change typically referred to in the local and 
                                                          
8
 I choose to use the terms “commercialized” and “noncommercial” or “grassroots” in place of Almeida’s “corrupt” 
and “authentic” in order to avoid confusion with the latter terms’ other usage in musicological discourse, and to 
avoid associations between discourses of authenticity and broad value judgements placed on the musical practices in 
question. 
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international press as Nayda.   Under Morocco’s previous monarch Hassan II, artistic expression, 
whether in music, art, literature, or film, was subject to intense governmental censorship. After 
Muhammad VI’s coronation, state censorship relaxed to promote a “new official discourse of 
openness and modernity” (Almeida 2013, 322).   Hip hop music gained a much wider following 
during this period as musicians were allowed access to public spaces that had been closed to 
them under the previous regime.  The increase in expressive freedom facilitated an explosion of 
national and international popular music festivals, the largest of which is the annual Mawazine 
Festival in Rabat. Mawazine and events like it typically feature popular international artists as 
well as local acts, and are met with both criticism and celebration by Moroccan musicians and 
audiences. These festivals and their impact on popular musical expression will be discussed in 
detail in the following chapter.   
It is misleading to present Nayda and the numerous musical events with which it is 
associated as a homogenized and unproblematic whole.  Even the term itself, meaning wake up 
or stand up in Moroccan colloquial Arabic (Darija), was coined by journalists and largely 
intended as a political message decrying sociopolitical apathy among the nation’s urban youth.  
Though the command is utilized by many emcees and appears repeatedly in lyrics from the 
period, it often conveys a very different sentiment in a purely musical context. According to 
Almeida, some hip hop artists argue that the term simply encourages audience participation 
during a performance by literally calling on listeners to stand, and object to the word’s overt 
politicization.  In the same vein, this label creates an impression of unity among artists associated 
with Nayda and frames them as part of a larger social movement (Almeida 2013, 323).  
Approaching the Moroccan hip hop scene in this way fails to account for the numerous strategies 
employed by musicians to navigate the linguistic and musical spaces between regime rhetoric 
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and sentiments of popular discontent.  It also discounts the possibility of viewing musical 
production as a contested expressive space that neither totally affirms nor denies state-endorsed 
discourse.  
Regardless of the exact political affiliations of its associated artists, Nayda served the 
important musical and social functions of allowing previously censored forms of musical 
practice a place in the Moroccan musical vocabulary and of permitting open affiliation with these 
emerging genres for the first time. State-sponsored television and radio began to occasionally 
feature popular Moroccan hip hop artists, and some musicians have since enjoyed a level of fame 
outside their home country made possible, in part, by increasing permissibility and visibility in 
the media. A changing gender dynamic is also somewhat visible in the audiences of hip hop 
concerts.  I Love Hip Hop in Morocco, a 2007 documentary film produced by American activists 
and independent filmmakers Joshua Asen and Jennifer Needlman, details the impacts of Nayda 
on Moroccan musical practice through the organization of the nation’s first all- rap music 
festival.  In the film, a number of audience members participating in these concerts are young 
women.  At performances of popular music, more rigid gendering of public spaces seems to 
break down somewhat, allowing women to assert both their physical and symbolic presence 
(Asen and Needleman 2007). 
Hip Hop and (Female) Symbols of Regime Legitimacy: Fnaire’s “Ma Tqich Bladi” 
On May 16, 2003, the somewhat optimistic political atmosphere inspired by increasing 
democratization and Nayda’s expressive openness was severely disrupted when a group of 
militants committed a violent attack on Casablanca.  Ten suicide bombers simultaneously 
detonated explosives at locations throughout the city, including a popular hotel, foreign-owned 
restaurants, and a Jewish community center.  The attack killed forty-one civilians and wounded 
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over one hundred others.  The suspects were all Moroccan citizens with ties to Al-Qaida, a 
revelation that seriously complicated official discourses on Morocco as a nation free from the 
radicalization plaguing its neighbors to the east and south (Sciolino 2003).  The bombings sent 
shockwaves through both the political and artistic communities and resulted in renewed 
restrictions on public expression and free speech in the form of anti-terrorism legislation.  
This legislation primarily manifested as crackdowns on regime opposition of all types, 
especially Islamist and socialist political groups, on the relatively vague grounds of “national 
security” (Storm 2009, 997–999).  Though not banned outright, many burgeoning forms of 
popular music, including hip hop, were also painted as complicit in the violence if they failed to 
conform to the state-endorsed rhetoric against both secularism and radical Islamism (Rogers 
2012, 458). Through the elimination of both Islamist and secular oppositional voices, the regime 
worked to silence two of the most effective modes of past dissident engagement: Islam and 
western-modeled feminism.  This depoliticized the subjects of gender equality and 
democratization of the public sphere while simultaneously granting the monarchy greater control 
over this discourse and its symbolic sociopolitical significance.   
Fnaire provided a widely recognized musical response to the months of unrest 
immediately following the 2003 incident. The ensemble had existed in some capacity prior to 
their 2003 release, but the popularity of “Ma Tqich Bladi” cemented Fnaire’s position in the 
emergent rap scene. The group hails from Marrakesh, a city that along with Casablanca is 
considered at the center of Moroccan hip hop production and concerts, and was among the three 
locations of the nation’s first all-rap musical festival in 2006.  Fnaire’s centrality in the 
burgeoning hip hop community of the early 2000s brings to bear two important considerations. 
The first is that simplistic depictions of the ensemble as a mouthpiece for the regime and 
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therefore lacking in musical credibility overlook the reality of the group’s popularity and 
influence. The second, related point is that this very level of popularity makes Fnaire and their 
music a powerful potential field of engagement between the Moroccan regime and the public. 
I Love Hip Hop in Morocco highlights Fnaire’s ambiguous position between regime 
rhetoric and popular discourse.  The film follows its producer, Joshua Asen, as he pairs with 
several Moroccan musicians, including well-known acts such as DJ Key, H-Kayne, and Don 
Bigg, in an attempt to organize a series of all-hip hop concerts in Meknes, Marrakesh, and 
Casablanca. At times the film portrays these artists somewhat dramatically, highlighting stories 
of personal struggle against an oppressive political and religious climate. However, featured 
interviews with the artists encourage a far more nuanced understanding of their positions. 
Members of Fnaire in particular avoid outright engagement with questions of regime legitimacy. 
In one recorded interview, the group clearly places the impetus of Morocco’s social and political 
challenges in poverty and economic failure and when pressed, refuses to more directly address 
the monarchy’s role in continued social inequality. They admit that this form of censorship is 
self-imposed as part of a larger complex of social responsibility, though again the group locates 
the aegis of self-censorship not in the larger political structure but in each member’s individual 
desire to engage with public politics of respectability.  They connect their aesthetic choice to 
avoid the profanity that often contributes to the genre’s subversion in other contexts to their lack 
of direct engagement with forms of public political dissent (Asen and Needleman 2007).  
Members of Fnaire position themselves as “true Moroccans” as opposed to American or 
western European-influenced members of the opposition. This speaks to the creation of a socio-
musical complex in which musicians use hip hop to express, develop, and critique emergent 
modes of citizenship and national belonging. The group evokes the politics of authenticity to 
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draw a distinction between their locally influenced and therefore, authentically Moroccan music 
and the more globalized and allegedly commoditized work of their competitors.  In the context of 
Fnaire’s musical discourse, authenticity and commoditization are not understood as synonymous 
to political opposition on one hand and regime cooptation on the other, as is discussed above.  
Rather, these terms here refer to the ensemble’s sonic resemblance to Moroccan, rather than 
western, soundscapes.  To Fnaire, “authentic” Moroccan hip hop is that which draws on local 
forms and rejects overt usage of Francophone or American hip hop styles.  
While it is difficult to discuss an overarching stylistic hegemony in Moroccan hip hop as 
the genre is characterized by its musical and linguistic diversity, some regional generalizations 
do appear.  Fnaire’s home city of Marrakesh is often considered a hub for hip hop musicians 
whose work draws distinct influence from musical practices heard as more traditionally 
Moroccan in origin (Salois 2009).  The band’s regional affiliation and role in the development of 
the subgenre rap taqlīdī (traditional rap) increase the relevance of such claims and more firmly 
situate them within the purview of Morocco’s hip hop community.     
For instance, the ensemble calls their particular mode of lyrical delivery and rhythmic 
iteration “Aisawwa-style,” referring to local Sufi practices in which devotees reach an ecstatic 
trance state through repetitive rhythmic music, dance, and chanting.  In musical and stylistic 
discourse, this reference makes a clear discursive connection between Fnaire’s particular musical 
style in a genre with predominantly western origins, and distinctly local Sufi sonic practices.
9
   
On one hand these claims of musical authenticity can be seen as supporting accusations 
of regime cooptation through the creation and maintenance of a dichotomy between 
                                                          
9
 Fnaire is not the only hip hop ensemble to use the phrase Aissawa-style when describing their music: Marrakesh-
based group H-Kayne also calls their mode of rhythmic and lyrical delivery by this term. It is interesting to note that 
Fnaire and H-Kayne, while hailing from the same city, are not typically considered musically similar.  H-Kayne 
typically uses less melodic material and has a markedly harder mode of rapped lyrical delivery than Fnaire. This 
indicates that as a label, Aissawa style functions symbolically rather than strictly musically. 
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“authentically Moroccan” pro-monarchy hip hop and the American and Francophone-influenced 
music of political dissent.  Yet the ensemble’s simultaneous participation in the film and the 
concert series speaks to the non-linear relationship between musical production and political 
discourse.  Like many Moroccan hip hop musicians, the members of Fnaire do not address their 
musical choices outright.  Salois discusses this relatively common reticence in her dissertation, 
positing that among her numerous interlocutors, no musicians had formal training and thus might 
lack the learned vocabulary necessary to engage in confident conversation about musical 
specifics (Salois 2009). Even still, Fnaire’s reference to Moroccan musical practices is sonically 
realized through the presence of both distinctly North African, and American and European 
musical elements.  
Much of Fnaire’s early output features rapped verses alternating with a repetitious sung 
chorus, a structure common in most American and European hip hop of the same period.  The 
pronounced sound of drum kit, synthesizer, and turntables also resonates with the genre’s 
Francophone and American iterations that also permeated the soundscape of early Moroccan hip 
hop.  However, the chorus of “Ma Tqich Bladi” uses a minor pentatonic melody and a 
heterophonic singing style that more resemble some Aisawwa and Gnawa musical practices than 
the genre’s American or European iterations.  Fnaire’s consistent use of electric guitar played in 
a style quite distinct to the Saharan region of North Africa provides the ensemble’s work with a 
further regional signature.  The length of many songs is also worth noting.  In Fnaire’s work, as 
well as in Moroccan hip hop more generally, song length often stretches between four and six 
minutes.  This slightly extended length, coupled with an often repetitive rhythmic and musical 
structure can be heard as part of the larger soundscape of Moroccan popular music that is heavily 
influenced by the region’s prominent Sufi musical practices (Salois 2009).  Whether this 
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hybridization specifically contributes to Fnaire’s popularity and perceived political relevance is 
beyond the scope of this study, but the relationship between the ensemble’s musical choices and 
their rhetoric of Moroccan musical authenticity versus the alleged musical and political 
corruption of their internationally-influenced competitors should not be overlooked.   
“Ma Tqich Bladi,” meaning “don’t touch my country” in Darija, appeared almost 
immediately after the 2003 Casablanca attack and illustrates both visually and sonically the ways 
that these contestations for expressive power are enacted.  On the surface, the piece explicitly 
condemns the perpetrators of the attacks and calls for Moroccans to remain united against all 
forms of extremism and cultural imperialism. The title phrase was a common slogan for those 
backing the monarchy and the anti-terrorist measures instituted in the wake of the violence, 
appearing on billboards, t-shirts, and picket signs alike.  The words were often superimposed 
over the image of a red and green khamsa, linking the sentiment of solidarity to the feminized 
nation via the presence of Morocco’s national colors and the Hand of Fatima. 
Art history scholar Amanda Rogers proposes in a 2012 article that the regime’s renewed 
control over artistic and musical production immediately following the Casablanca terrorist 
attack allowed the Moroccan government to “sustain [itself] through a careful maintenance of 
expressive culture” in the face of large-scale ideological conflict (Rogers 2012, 456).  In 
Rogers’s analysis, the 2003 incident proved especially threatening because it undermined the 
monarchy’s claims to governmental legitimacy based in its status as a bastion of moderate Islam, 
and in the King’s position as Commander of the Faithful.  The regime’s response to the event 
assured that music, art, literature, and other forms of expression could not serve as potential 
conduits for alternative political discourse. This state-sponsored discourse, which operated 
within the framework of Islam but denied its explicit politicization, allowed the government to 
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acknowledge the presence of alternative modes of political and social engagement without 
necessarily granting them genuine legitimacy in the political sphere. 
  Mohammed Daadaoui examines the ways that the Moroccan regime exercises increased 
hegemonic control during times of national crisis through what he calls “rituals of power.”  
These acts allow the state to exert domination over citizens without resorting to violence, a feat 
achieved through “education, media, state performances, and spectacles.” Inscribing monarchical 
discourse on such institutions greatly increases its social efficacy without the need for overtly 
oppressive tactics by the state, and encourages levels of self-censorship as an implicit 
requirement for full social participation.  Daadaoui further argues that the state primarily 
manipulates social and religious symbols in order to reinforce the monarch’s primary and most 
powerful source of legitimacy: 
Symbolic manipulation of the sources of legitimacy in Morocco, and appeal to 
these particular symbols of Moroccan social identity, allows the monarchy to 
diffuse the Islamist challenge to its legitimacy amidst a slow process of 
liberalization, mainly by imposing two strategies of cooptation and confinement. 
(Daadaoui 2011, 4–6)   
 
I expand the targets of this tactic to include not only Islamist resistance to the regime, but 
secular, state-engaged feminist opposition as well.  
Many public reactions to the 2003 attacks witnessed the repurposing of this powerful 
feminine socio-religious symbol. The Hand is a significant religious-magical symbol for 
protection against the forces of spiritual and physical evil.  It is gendered as female and 
associated in rhetoric and design with the largely female practice of hennaing. Henna, in turn, 
resonates with post-colonial national identity and indigeneity. Rogers claims that the practice’s 
historical and discursive connection to southern Morocco and the Sahara imbues the Hand with 
national as well as religious connotations. The discourse around henna as both a product and a 
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practice originating from the country’s southern regions has been repurposed by both early post-
colonial nationalists and contemporary regime supporters to strengthen associations between 
regime legitimacy and an “indigenous” cultural memory independent of western colonial 
influence (Rogers 2012, 457).  As it symbolically references feminine spirituality and fertility 
through its association with domestic spaces and wedding ceremonies through the image of the 
hennaed bride, the use of the hennaed Hand implicitly locates this cultural memory in the 
feminized private sphere. Women’s roles as mothers and wives become paramount in 
safeguarding the nation not only through the caretaking of its future citizens but through the 
maintenance of a conscious national identity.   
Given this multivalent symbolic meaning, it is not surprising that the Hand appeared 
throughout regime-sponsored campaigns intended to bolster national unity after the 2003 
Casablanca bombings.  In this context, like in Fnaire’s music video, it typically appeared in red 
and green, with the country’s flag superimposed over the palm.  Rogers argues that this depiction 
“links the feminized nation to spiritual protection” and “simultaneously demarcates the 
boundaries of citizenship and attempts to curb political dissent within the framework of an all-
powerful monarchical state” (Rogers 2012, 457).  To take the analogy further, the 
superimposition of the Hand and the flag can also be understood to symbolically marry the 
nation, represented through its flag and national colors, to feminized cultural memory embodied 
in the khamsa.  In this imagery the nation itself is hennaed, not unlike a Moroccan bride.  The 
responsibility of social reproduction promised through the institutions of marriage resonates with 
women’s position as the mothers and caretakers of future generations of Moroccans, and thus of 
the nation itself.   
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Use of the Hand of Fatima as part of the post-2003 political climate located Moroccan 
citizenship in shared religious belief and cultural memory. Those standing outside this proposed 
ideological space were implicitly acknowledged as existing outside the boundaries of national 
citizenship as well.  Within the context of music and other forms of expressive culture beyond 
official regime rhetoric and visual production, the Hand signified patriotism and a rejection of 
the violent methods employed by the Casablanca bombers to some and tacit support of 
governmental oppression to others. Despite the reality of the suspects’ citizenship, evocation of 
both the khamsa and the phrase direct attention outward toward a perceived external threat.  
The title of Fnaire’s song and the album’s use of recognizable protest symbols 
automatically evoke this complex of ideas.  The chorus of the song repeats the anti-terrorist 
slogan by declaring: 
Don’t touch my country 
My land and the land of my grandfather 
My land and the land of my grandchildren 
My love is for my country
10
 
 
Including the popular slogan as both the piece’s title and its opening lyrics provides listeners 
with a clear reference point and immediately situates the song within the complex of pro-
monarchy and anti-terrorist activism.  The clear use of the singular possessive—“my country” 
and “my land” rather than “our country” and “our land”—echoes the exclusionary language 
prevalent in post-2003 regime discourse. Though the lyrics ostensibly seek to reject the 
perpetrators of the Casablanca attack as morally un-Moroccan, the ensemble’s possessive 
declaration of both the nation in the abstract and of the physical land it represents opens up the 
possibility for a much more exclusionary reading (Rogers 2012, 460).  When placed in dialogue 
                                                          
10
 Translation by the author. 
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with the gendered sociopolitical complex of the khamsa, the command “don’t touch my country” 
carries multivalent significance. 
The official music video for “Ma Tqich Bladi” plays more heavily on the visual 
association between the song’s title and the symbolically potent khamsa.  The opening frames of 
the video feature a record on a turntable, its face emblazoned with the red and green Hand and 
the words “ma tqich bladi,” echoing the common pro-monarchy signs in style and color. Here the 
text and image serve a double purpose: they both introduce the upcoming song to the listener and 
allude to the group’s stance in the ongoing political conflict.  The Hand aids in and reinforces the 
gendering of the nation, and when placed in tandem with Fnaire’s warning against touching “my 
country,” it becomes an index of the monarch’s masculine protection over his feminized 
subjects.  As Rogers and Daadaoui point out, this strongly alludes to the king’s role as 
Commander of Faithful and, by extension, a complex of ideas about the semi-divine nature of the 
regime and the monarch’s role in fostering an environment of “tolerant monarchical Islam” 
(Daadaoui 2011 and Rogers 2012). 
It is important to recall that the 2003 Casablanca attacks came on the heels of the largest 
legal reform in Morocco’s independent history, and that much of the discourse surrounding the 
prevention of terrorism also, intentionally or inadvertently, called on recent attempts to 
secularize family and personal status law.  This made questions of monarchical legitimacy 
inseparable from questions of women’s places within the public and legal spheres.  Though 
many Moroccan women involved in mainstream feminist organizations, as well as international 
observers referred to the 2003 reforms as a clear and meaningful victory for gender equality, the 
ongoing conflation of regime legitimacy and the king’s patriarchal leadership complicates this 
narrative somewhat.  The public and governmental response to the 2003 Casablanca bombings 
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provided evidence that despite legal gains, women’s roles in the public sphere remained limited 
as their physical and symbolic presence continued to be closely tied to the nation as abstractly 
conceived rather than actively realized.    
“Ma Tqich Bladi” and its accompanying video illuminate the continued presence of this 
gendered, patriarchal political complex. The music begins and the camera pans through a 
relatively nondescript urban environment, eventually coming to rest on the ensemble. The 
members of Fnaire appear dressed in clothing common in much American hip hop imagery, 
including jerseys advertising American sports teams.  The verbal expression of Moroccan 
national solidarity paired with a visual reference to American hip hop culture via the ensemble’s 
style of dress seems to create a tension between the song’s lyrics and the visual components 
present in the music video.  Musically, however, “Ma Tqich Bladi” may be seen to join these 
seemingly disparate elements.  The piece begins with a six-bar guitar solo played in a distinctly 
North African style.  It features pronounced use of down-strokes and ornaments created by 
hammering on the frets with the left hand.  These techniques are heard throughout the pan-
Saharan region and achieved recognition in Morocco through the music of 1970s fusion band 
Nass el-Ghiwane.
11
   
Joined with their discourse on Moroccan musical influence, a sonic reference to the 
emblematic folk ensemble works to solidify Fnaire’s claims to national authenticity.  However, 
Nass el-Ghiwane’s musical legacy is a complicated one.  While popular discourse tends to 
connect the group to courageous political opposition, citing their lyrics as veiled challenges to 
the state’s authority during the repressive Years of Lead, ‘Omar Es-Sayed, the ensemble’s 
surviving founding member, rejects this depiction.  He claims that rather than resisting state 
authority, Nass el-Ghiwane’s music was “aimed at a socio-cultural inquiry, asking towards what 
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 For a more in-depth discussion of Nass el-Ghiwane’s influence on contemporary hip hop, see Salois 2009. 
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future the rapidly changing society was moving” (Salois 2009).  Whether or not the members of 
Fnaire intended to evoke Nass el-Ghiwane’s complex political legacy with the introductory 
measures of “Ma Tqich Bladi” is unclear, but intentional or not, the discursive and musical link 
created between the two groups highlights Fnaire’s own sociopolitical ambiguity.  
This is also visually reinforced.  Opening shots of the ensemble are interspersed with 
images of unnamed individuals who populate the music video’s urban landscape. These 
“ordinary Moroccan citizens” of all ages and apparent socioeconomic classes add their voices to 
Fnaire’s in demarcating the boundaries of Moroccan citizenship on the grounds of moral 
belonging.  The individuals responsible for the 2003 Casablanca attack may have held Moroccan 
passports to mark them as legal citizens, but the language and symbols surrounding “Ma Tqich 
Bladi” make it clear that they are not granted moral citizenship, as their actions fall outside the 
boundaries of this category.  Several people featured in the video hold up their right hands in 
invocation of the khamsa, not only symbolically but physically warding off the acts of terrorism 
and those responsible.   
Yet despite a title and imagery suggesting a feminized nation, the individuals shown in 
the music video, like the members of Fnaire themselves, are exclusively male.  The lack of 
women’s physical presence on screen delimits a gendered dichotomy in which women retain 
their roles as passive culture-bearers, while men exist as active agents in the public space.  Male 
citizenship includes the ability to actively participate in sociopolitical processes and thus join the 
monarch in his defense of the nation. Women, by contrast, appear only discursively as the 
national object to be protected.  
 This is diametrically opposed to the gendered complex often present in American hip 
hop videos.  In this context, male artists tend to express a strictly masculine identity while their 
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music videos predominantly depict women.  However, women’s inclusion in American hip hop 
videos is most often equally—if differently—objectifying.  In both cases women are reduced to 
symbolic objects and largely stripped of their agency.  Much American hip hop achieves this 
through the overt sexualization of the female body.  Fnaire and other Moroccan artists, in 
contrast, exchange women’s individual bodily presence for their role as an abstract sociopolitical 
symbol.  While an in-depth analysis of this comparison lies outside the scope of this project, it is 
worth noting the ways that gendered musical expression resonates and changes across 
international borders.     
A visual and lyrical moment in Fnaire’s music video particularly replete with gendered 
politico-religious symbols involves the members of Fnaire holding a Qur’an and gesturing to it 
as they perform against a backdrop of graffitied brick.  When condemning the perpetrators of the 
attack, the group declares in unison: 
It’s a shame what you wanted 
It’s haram what you did 
So raise the khamsa  
for peace morning and night.
12
  
 
The use of the Arabic word haram, often translated as “taboo” or “forbidden,” is replete with 
religious significance, implying a sense of religious condemnation that transcends mere social 
shame or embarrassment (Rogers 2012, 460). The lyrics and the clear visual presence of the 
Qur’an make obvious the politico-religious message that the images of the Hand and the title of 
the song only imply. There is a clear parallel to be drawn between the fight against terrorist 
threats and the monarch’s semi-divine position.  Both the feminine connotations of the Hand and 
the implications of patriarchal national protection invoked through it also solidify a link between 
the guardianship of the nation and women’s political and legal roles as dictated in the 
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Mudawwana. Here these symbols work together to create a referential complex in which Islam, 
the Moroccan nation, and women’s roles as de-politicized citizens reinforce, rather than call into 
question, the monarch’s fundamental authority.  
 On one hand, the depiction of Islam and religious piety in a typically non-sacred context 
may be understood as having a democratizing effect.  Looking again to the influence of Nass el-
Ghiwane, whose music and aural references to Gnawa and Aissawa Sufi practices brought 
expressions of religious faith into alternative performance contexts, Fnaire’s invocation of Islam 
in their lyrics and visuals works to open a discursive space typically closed to popular culture 
and the general public.  As Salois explains of Nass el-Ghiwane, “The alignment celebrated [in 
the ensemble’s music] is between ‘authentic’ Moroccan Muslim practice and the citizenry, rather 
than between the citizens, the official Islam, and the state” (Salois 2009).  Considering “Ma 
Tqich Bladi” in a similar light opens up a possible reading of the song as an attempt to reactivate 
Moroccan Sufism as a mode of popular political engagement.  While Fnaire’s self-proclaimed 
Aissawa-style, along with their musical references to the folk-fusion sound of Nass el-Ghiwane 
and their contemporaries, offers compelling evidence for a musical statement that denies the 
official power of state-supported Islam, the group’s use of religious language and symbols to 
demarcate boundaries of moral national belonging so closely aligned to official discourse on the 
subject complicates this understanding.  
The connection drawn between Moroccan national belonging and Islam in both the 
song’s lyrics and visuals reiterates the official governmental position after the 2003 attacks that 
religion did not belong in the public political sphere but rather within the realm of uncritical 
patriotism and national culture bearing, a similar position to that which women had also been 
relegated.  This discursive shift, occurring across various forms of cultural and political 
55 
 
expression, helped to tacitly bolster the monarchy’s claims to legitimacy by removing the 
potentially powerful framework of Islam from all oppositional rhetoric and making the king’s 
claims of religious legitimation effectively indisputable.  The king’s status as Commander of the 
Faithful has religious as well as gendered implications.  “The Faithful” here does not refer to all 
citizens regardless of religious affiliation, but specifically to the community of Moroccan 
Muslims whose social and religious behavior echoes that which is approved by the regime’s 
message of “tolerant monarchical Islam.”  The monarch’s legitimacy thus becomes dependent on 
both his religious and patriarchal protection.  As in Fnaire’s music video, references to religious 
authority are then used to demarcate and reinforce this political space rather than challenge it.  
Conclusion: Fields of Contestation 
It is here that the connection between feminist opposition, Mudawwana reform, and 
modes of regime legitimation become apparent.  Despite large legal gains made by state-engaged 
feminist organizations around the turn of the twenty-first century, the political climate emerging 
in the wake of the 2003 terrorist attacks reinforced women’s subjugated social status.  The chief 
mode of monarchical legitimacy and of demarcating the border between peaceful Moroccans and 
potentially violent, extremist “others” was located at this nexus of gendered social space and 
Islam.  The king’s role as Commander of the Faithful both reinforced women’s roles as culture 
bearers and objects of national belonging, and removed religious discourse from the public 
political sphere.  Fnaire’s “Ma Tqich Bladi” bears witness to the symbolic contestation occurring 
across these levels of political engagement.  The song evokes common feminine symbols and 
voices, yet the accompanying visuals locate agency clearly in the male domain.  It also makes 
use of powerful religious language but only as a means to reinforce the dominant governmental 
56 
 
ideology and clarify the boundaries of Moroccan moral belonging and citizenship under the 
umbrella of beneficent monarchical protection. 
When viewed in this light alone, it appears that the ensemble’s political orientation 
entirely supports the monarchy and the current regime.  Group member’s actions outside their 
musical production serve to complicate this framework, however.  As previously discussed, 
Fnaire continues to be involved in large-scale projects such as the I Love Hip Hop in Morocco 
concert series that aim to increase artistic autonomy in the hip hop community by changing 
established modes of royal and governmental patronage.  Not only does this demand the 
recognition of an individual musician’s agency outside limiting frameworks such as coopted by 
the regime versus independently oppositional, it also supports the notion that music and popular 
expressive culture are an emergent field of contestation rather than a reified expression of 
political allegiance.  In examining Fnaire’s hit song, we glimpse the struggle between symbols of 
regime legitimation and feminist dissent that marked the post-2003 period. 
The following chapter will continue to explore hip hop music as a field of contestation 
between the incumbent regime and new modes of Moroccan feminist engagement.  Beginning in 
2009, a renewed effort by various feminist organizations witnessed the official abolition of the 
Mudawwana.  It was replaced by the secular Laws of Personal Status in 2010.  This development 
did not spell the end for the Moroccan feminist movement, however, as difficulties with the 
law’s implementation as well as challenges to its commitment to social and economic equality 
began almost immediately following its indoctrination.  These developments have been broadly 
taken up under the auspices of the nation’s 20M movement in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring 
protests in Morocco.  This marks a large-scale shift in the ways that feminism and gender 
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equality are addressed in both the political and the expressive spheres and it is to this shift that I 
next turn my attention.     
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Chapter Three 
 
MC Soultana, Mudawwana Reform, and the 2011 Arab Spring in Morocco 
 
Less than ten years after the attacks in Casablanca and the reform of the Mudawwana, 
Moroccan citizens again took to the streets and the Internet to demand political reform. As with 
the protests of the last decade, the 2011 Arab Spring’s articulations in Morocco continued to 
engage with questions of women’s rights and increased sociopolitical engagement through legal 
and social change.  These recent protests also garnered a rise in visible musical reactions among 
the hip hop community as the genre has become a widely accepted mainstay of the nation’s 
music industry.  It is not only this growing acceptance into mainstream society that makes 
contemporary Moroccan hip hop music and its relationship to political dissent an important point 
of focus, but also apparent shifts in the ways that artists engage with political opposition in 
general and feminist opposition more specifically.   
This chapter explores the musical output of emerging hip hop artist Youssra Oukra, 
known onstage as MC Soultana, as indicative of the changing landscape of Moroccan musical-
political interaction.  MC Soultana’s music makes for a particularly compelling case study as she 
is one of the first Moroccan women to have a successful rap career.  Thus, the perspectives 
embedded in her music, videos, and lyrics are inherently distinct from those of male artists 
commenting on political and social injustice. Her engagement with questions of Moroccan 
citizenship also points to changing attitudes toward the state institution and the monarch’s role as 
a masculine national protector.  When placed in dialogue with Fnaire’s “Ma Tqich Bladi” 
discussed in the previous chapter, the changes illustrated in Soultana’s work become readily 
apparent. 
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 Beyond her music, Soultana’s public statements will also be considered as highlighting 
new modes of governmental engagement or, in many cases, choices to disengage with the state 
apparatus.  Compared to the first chapter’s discussion of twentieth-century state-engaged 
feminism, these new attempts to work around and outside of regime-approved discourse also 
relate to changing notions of women’s roles as citizens.  As I will illustrate, MC Soultana’s 
music and her actions as an artist defy classification as either entirely oppositional or complicit 
in regime cooptation.  She owes a degree of her commercial success to recognition received 
through royally patronized music festivals, but at the same time her highly critical hit, “Sawt 
Nissa” (“Voice of Women”) has been celebrated by feminist activists in Morocco and abroad as 
a potential anthem to their political cause.  The ways that Soultana publicly positions herself 
inside these competing, but not necessarily diametrically opposed, discourses sheds light on the 
complex relationship between Morocco’s new feminist opposition, state patronage, and the role 
of the musician as an individual.  Much like Fnaire at the turn of the century, MC Soultana’s 
artistic work can be understood as a zone in which competing modalities of feminism, protest, 
and citizenship are explored and contested.  I begin with the widespread protests in Morocco 
beginning in February 2011.   
Women and the 20M 
The so-called Arab Spring protests occurring throughout the Mashriq and Maghreb 
beginning in 2011 were realized in the Moroccan context via a youth-oriented collective whose 
demonstrations were organized primarily through mass digital media and became highly visible 
online.  This loosely organized group earned the name 20 February Movement (20M) after the 
date of its largest public demonstration.  Unlike uprisings occurring in other North African 
nations during the same year, 20M reached only around 300,000 participants at its largest and 
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tended to garner much less international media attention.  Protests in Morocco also remained 
relatively subdued, resulting in only one violent incident (Molina 2011, 438).
13
 The grievances 
raised by the protestors in 2011 were not far removed from those that inspired the 2003 
demonstrations discussed in previous chapters.  Many people expressed disillusionment with 
government programs intended to spur economic growth and decrease the country’s large wage 
gap, as well as with failures to increase access to economic and educational opportunities across 
socioeconomic lines.  The much-disputed family and personal status laws also continued to 
receive attention, with some factions of the movement calling for further secularization, while 
others argued for a return to earlier legal forms more reliant on the Maliki Islamic school of 
jurisprudence (Ramhøj 2013, 97).
 14
   
According to Irene Fernández Molina’s overview of the movement published in 
November 2011, this wide array of often contradictory political positions has characterized 20M 
since its formation and may be somewhat to blame for its rather feeble international support as 
compared to concurrent protests elsewhere in the Arab world.  As a movement dependent on 
social media and other online forums, it proved difficult for 20M to reach any consensus on its 
larger political orientation.  This in turn bolstered criticisms from the regime calling the 
demonstrations leaderless, and referring to those participating as secularists, atheists, and radical 
Islamists alike.  In a region generally perceived by international observers as fraught with 
religiously based conflict and social challenges, the Moroccan government’s international 
reputation has repeatedly hinged on its position as politically and religiously moderate.  In 
positioning protestors on either end of an imagined “religious spectrum”—completely non-
religious on one side and completely radicalized on the other—the regime worked to ostracize 
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 In the city of Al Hoceima, clashes between demonstrators and police forces resulted in five deaths. 
14
 The impact of these changes has yet to be fully analyzed, but for a survey of reforms from 2011 to 2013, see 
Ramhøj, 97-107. 
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the 20 February Movement both domestically and transnationally.  Furthermore, most Moroccan 
protestors sidestepped outright criticisms of the monarch himself, choosing only to speak in the 
more broad terms of policy and institutional issues, and avoiding overt challenges to the king’s 
authority on either religious or secular grounds.
 
 Molina cites this hesitant attitude among 
demonstrators, as well as successful counter-protest measures taken by the regime, as preventing 
the 20 February Movement from attaining greater recognition and political success (Almeida 
2013, 324). 
Despite its harsh criticisms against participants, the Moroccan government generally 
permitted the 20M demonstrations to occur without interference from security forces.  Shortly 
after the largest protests occurred in February, the king announced the formation of a committee 
charged with constitutional and legal reform.  The draft of Morocco’s latest constitution—since 
passed into law—received high praise from the international community, including a letter of 
commendation from the European Union calling the new document a “significant step” and 
declared that it “signals a clear commitment to democracy and respect for human rights” (Ashton 
and Füle 2011).  Regardless of international praise and recognition, the new constitution proved 
an exercise in compromise for many individuals involved in the 20M.  As in 2003, the 
government enacted what many Moroccan activists considered superficial changes without any 
substantial alterations to deeper institutional frameworks.  In Articles 41 and 42 of the new 
constitution, for example, the monarch retains the title of Commander of the Faithful and is 
granted presidency of the Superior Council of the ‘Ulemas, Morocco’s highest religious 
authority.  This continues in the same pattern as the regime’s response to the protests of the late 
1990s and early 2000s, in which the potentially powerful resource of religiously based 
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opposition is rendered effectively inaccessible and the king’s authority remains fundamentally 
infallible (Molina 2011, 441).  
However, closer examination of the movement’s specific content and array of supporters 
reveals some important distinctions between the contemporary opposition and that of the recent 
past.  Foremost among these is the visible, bodily involvement of women.  February 20, 2011’s 
call to action on YouTube featured the alternating voices and faces of both men and women 
declaring their support for the opposition and expressing specific grievances against the regime.  
In nearly all the clips, the individual begins his or her statement with a declaration of citizenship 
by reciting the words “Ana maghrebi/maghrebia,” or “I am Moroccan.”   The individuals in the 
video span a wide range of ages, dress style, class, ethnicity, and religious affiliation evident 
through clear visual cues.  By more concretely connecting the abstract concept of Moroccan 
nationhood directly to its citizens through these visual and verbal cues, the nation is no longer a 
political or geographical object to be possessed but a social concept constituted by diverse and 
individually realized identities. That a large number of women physically appear in the video and 
can be heard making this declaration runs counter to the message of the post-Casablanca 2003 
demonstrations, in which women and their bodies were mobilized as national symbols. Here they 
are exercising their agency as members of the national citizenry.  Considered in this light, the 
20M’s online protests indicate a shift in the ways women perceive their roles in the political 
process. 
In a 2014 article in the Journal of North African Studies, Moroccan journalist Samia 
Errazzouki argues that it is not only the actions of women directly associated with the 20M, who 
are largely a well-educated and economically privileged group, but the indirect actions of 
primarily socially and economically disenfranchised women not openly associated with the 20M 
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that provided the movement with its momentum. The death of a young woman named Fadoua 
Laroui who committed suicide by publicly self-immolating after the rejection of her housing 
application is credited as one pivotal moment that forced long-standing tensions to finally erupt 
into large-scale demonstrations across the country (Errazzouki 2014, 259).   
Called the “Moroccan Mohammed Bouazizi” in reference to the Tunisian fruit-vendor 
whose self-immolation began the political uprisings in that country, Laroui’s actions came to 
symbolize not only the impacts of entrenched economic inequalities between the lower class and 
the elite Makhzen, but the marginalization experienced by impoverished women in particular.  
As a working single mother, Laroui was doubly disenfranchised: she lacked the social security 
provided by marriage and was forced to eschew her socially and legally sanctioned domestic role 
in order to materially provide for her family.  Her tragic actions spoke to the social inequalities 
created by Morocco’s rapid transition to a neoliberal capitalist economy coupled with legal and 
political systems still dependent on modes of patriarchal protection for women’s social security 
and validation.  Her choice to end her life in such a graphic and public manner demonstrated to 
some feminist regime opponents the ultimate means of asserting bodily control in the public 
sphere. That such severe physical pain and ultimately, death could be considered in any way 
preferable to her social and personal situation resonated very strongly with men and women 
alike, who saw such drastic actions as a powerful symbol of the suffering and continual 
oppression of impoverished women, and impoverished single mothers in particular.  Laroui had 
no direct connection with the 20M, but her death just one day after the movement’s initial protest 
created a point of focus for regime opponents and spurred thousands more into the streets.  
 In addition to the actions of politically unaffiliated individuals like Fadoua Laroui, a large 
number of lower class women actively joined the ongoing protests throughout 2011.  In May of 
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the same year, video footage of a police officer brutally beating a woman while she held an 
infant during a peaceful protest in the impoverished Casablanca suburb of Sbata circulated 
widely as an example of the many social injustices facing under-privileged Moroccan women.  
According to Errazzouki, the unnamed woman’s presence represented a threat to the state in 
several ways: as an economically marginalized woman publicly asserting her political dissent 
against obvious state repression, she stood in blatant contrast to her proscribed class and gender 
roles.  Moreover, that the source of state authority in this case was a male who used violence to 
assert this authority represented a striking example of the damaging effects of institutionalized 
state patriarchy.  The presence of a young infant in the video added another layer of subversion 
to the protester’s actions as it visually linked her to motherhood and the strictly domestic roles 
associated with the care of young children (Errazzouki 2014, 259).
15
  This placed her within the 
de-politicized realm of national culture bearing.  Her participation in a highly political event 
created obvious tension between the status of mothers as national symbols and women as 
individuals and active political agents.    
 The above accounts of women’s direct and indirect involvement in the Feb 20 Movement 
highlight an important change in the perception of women’s roles, not only in the political 
process, but in the designation of the boundaries of citizenship more generally.  Rather than 
objects to be guarded against external concerns, the women in question actively work to protect 
themselves against the internal injustices of the state and the Makhzen.  This is not to say that all 
individuals involved in the 20M’s ongoing efforts are committed to a specific gendered ideology.  
Much like the Moroccan hip hop community discussed in the previous chapter, the movement’s 
members remain loosely affiliated and it is misleading to consider their actions as motivated by 
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 As the woman remains unidentified, I do not wish to assume the infant she carried was her own but rather that the 
presence of the child was enough for viewers to label her as a mother, at least in a symbolic sense. 
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identical concerns or belief systems.  Nevertheless, the inclusion of women from a variety of 
ethnic and class backgrounds presents an important contrast to the earlier political movements 
discussed in the preceding chapters. 
Contemporary Feminism and the State: New Modes of (Dis)Engagement 
   Though the 20M defies cohesive labelling with terms such as “feminist,” the movement 
still addresses many of the same sociopolitical issues that have long been at the center of the 
Moroccan feminist cause, including income and educational inequality, lack of women’s 
representation in government, and the ongoing impacts of family and personal status law.  
However, this generation of politically active women position themselves quite differently vis a 
vis the regime than feminist activists of the past.  Moroccan scholar Zakia Salime (2012) points 
out that some apparent similarities between the contemporary movement and previous 
Mudawwana reform efforts actually possess very different underlying ideologies.  She writes,  
The framing of the movement’s goals in terms of equality and the 
institutionalization of parity in the movement’s structures, indicate the emergence 
of a ‘new feminism.’  This is the counter-topography that disturbs first the NGO-
ization of feminist activism and demands, second, the confinement of this 
activism to women’s spaces, and third, its regulation by state institutions. (Salime 
2012, 104) 
 
 Rather than speak in terms of gender equality per se, activists of the 20M tend to discuss 
the somewhat more broadly understood subject of gender parity.  These concepts, while related, 
are not identical.  State-engaged feminist organizations and NGOs that use the language of 
gender equality or women’s rights often operate in predominantly female social spaces and 
frame these issues as problems to be addressed and ultimately solved by women, while Salime’s 
“new feminist” activists express a desire to assert their gendered activities into male-dominated 
social spheres through visible parity of men’s and women’s bodies on public display.  This also 
implies that inequality is, or at least should be, something that concerns men and women alike. 
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The movement’s calls to action on YouTube tacitly represent this ideology by alternating 
between men and women’s faces and voices at a nearly one-to-one ratio.  In conversation 
Salime’s interviewees indicated a new approach to the topic of gender and gender equality that is 
encompassed within larger contemporary narratives of social justice, and thus lies at the 
intersection of numerous concerns not directly related to individuals’ gendered identities.16 
 This reframing of gender equality can be understood in multiple ways.  On one hand, it 
represents disillusionment with state-engaged feminist organizations that have been accused of 
regime cooptation and elitism.  By breaking with these groups, some activists hope to achieve 
meaningful advances in equality and social justice that previous organizational models have 
failed to accomplish. That many feminist organizations refused to support the 20M from its 
outset, choosing instead to back the monarchy and ratify the new constitution, has created 
considerable tension and resulted in the emergence of what Salime terms “critical citizenship.”17  
This is an expression of citizenship that hinges on a complete lack of engagement with state 
apparatuses in the belief that any encounter with the king or the Makhzen only bolsters the 
regime’s claims to authority.   
 Whereas state-engaged feminism relies on monarchical cooperation for advances in 
women’s rights via existing legal frameworks, the feminism of the 20M eschews any 
monarchical involvement in favor of more grassroots operations such as independently organized 
artistic festivals and self-produced publications. The movement’s critical citizenship is also 
realized by a record low turnout at the polls during parliamentary elections since 2011.  While 
this mode of disengagement outwardly appears to encourage radical political revolution by 
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To my knowledge, this rhetoric recognizes male and female gender identities, but leaves little room for the 
validation of alternative, non-binary gender identities.  
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 Salime uses this term in reference to the context of twenty-first century Morocco as described by her interlocutors, 
and does not engage directly with existing literature on citizenship studies in this particular work. 
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denying political change through the more traditional means of elected officials and 
governmental discourse, the reality for many members of 20M is more complicated.  Despite a 
refusal to engage with the monarch, Salime points to a reluctance among protestors to support 
more radical calls for violent revolutionary action.   What this means for the future direction of 
the movement remains to be seen (Salime 2012, 106–108).    
 This disruption of traditional lines of support has required activists to look elsewhere 
along the political spectrum for aid. In addition to encouraging disengagement from existing 
feminist organizations and by proxy, the regime, broadening feminist discourse has also allowed 
the 20M to include a wider variety of political actors.  This is especially important as one of the 
movement’s largest supporters to date is the anti-monarchy group the Islamists of Justice and 
Spirituality.  According to Salime’s interlocutors, the group’s decision to participate in the 20M 
was considered by some a key component of the protests’ success as it provided the movement 
with thousands of additional bodies during street events around the country.  But the visible 
inclusion of openly Islamist rhetoric that often supports a reinstitution of Maliki-based personal 
status and family law represents to some a complication of the movement’s fundamental goals.  
In short, this emerging oppositional culture is in fact highly localized and often defies any single 
ideological underpinning.  The forms of popular expression associated with the 20M are equally 
diverse and pose similar challenges in analysis.  
Grey Areas of Popular Expression: Hip Hop, Festivals, and Politics, 2011–2014 
Since the passage of constitutional reforms in late 2011, the 20M remains highly visible 
in Moroccan public life via continued protests, an active online community, and annual artistic 
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festivals organized in various urban centers.
18
  The multi-leveled interaction between Moroccan 
rappers, state-sponsored festivals, the regime, and the 20M is complex, but sheds some light on 
the ways in which different and often contradictory sociopolitical views are expressed and 
contested via contemporary popular culture. MC Soultana provides one such example, but before 
more thoroughly exploring her artistic output it is necessary to first analyze the larger context in 
which her music and professional career are embedded.  Soultana’s international success was 
made possible, in part, by her open participation in large, regime- sponsored music festivals.  
This appears to contradict the political position expressed through her lyrics and several 
interviews.  However, much like the 20M opposition itself, politically engaged hip hop 
musicians fail to conform to any one mode of resistance.  
In the Moroccan context, festivals serve as important means of commercial and popular 
success for musicians, as well as venues through which to form expressive communities and 
musical solidarities (Belghazi 2006, 100).  For political actors these artistic and musical events 
also create “a wall against obscurantism and terrorism,” a role considered particularly important 
in the wake of the 2003 bombings (Mous and Wazif 2008, 295). Questions of sponsorship and 
patronage complicate this discourse, especially for performers of popular youth-oriented musics.  
Since festivals began to dominate the Moroccan cultural landscape during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, most have received a large amount of financial backing from official governmental 
sources such as the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, and 
the Aid Fund for Theater and Music, as well as directly from the monarch himself (Belghazi and 
Graiouid 2013, 265).  This funding has contributed to a growing association between public 
performance spaces and the ruling elite.  The role of the government in organizing and funding 
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The website https://www.mamfakinch.com/  has been particularly influential since the 2011 protests. Despite 
threats of government censorship in 2012, the site remains active and regularly publishes articles in Arabic, French, 
and English. 
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these events intimately ties them to the rhetoric and cultural policies of the government and the 
Makhzen.  Belghazi and Graiouid describe popular cultural production and the systems of state 
patronage in Morocco as “ambivalent liaisons.” The necessity of such patronage for artists’ and 
musicians’ financial solubility often seriously complicates the role of cultural expression and 
production in Morocco’s ongoing political debates (ibid.). Alternative forms of patronage have 
grown in importance over the last several years due, in part, to the unfavorable political climate 
surrounding mainstream governmental organizations and political parties, especially among 
youths and youth-oriented music.  It is important to note, however, that these alternative forms of 
patronage are not entirely unproblematic as they often include various non-governmental 
organizations from the United States or Western Europe which tend to entrench local performers 
in different, but equally hierarchical power relationships. 
 Patronage of Moroccan music festivals functions as a highly hierarchical system.  The 
highest form of patronage an organization can receive comes from the king himself, while 
members of his cabinet and other ministries extend their support as well.  Festival patrons should 
not be considered mere economic sponsors, solely supplying financial support.  In Darija, the 
word for patron (ar-ri’āya) implies a unilateral relationship, one of guardianship and oversight 
rather than of equality and mutual reciprocation (Belghazi and Graiouid 2013, 266).  This makes 
festival patronage a symbol of regime control that is not necessarily dependent on the specific 
content of the event in question.  According to Mohammed Daadaoui, “Rituals of power are 
displayed in elaborate ceremonies and spectacles to aggrandize the regime and sanctify it in the 
national memory” (Daadaoui 2011, 3).  The element of spectacle is clearly apparent in many 
music festivals that enjoy monarchical patronage, creating an association between the event’s 
scale and the regime’s financial and social capital.  Though the rituals and symbols of power 
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Daadaoui describes most often require a “combination of modernity and tradition” in order to 
reinforce regime legitimacy on the basis of tradition and religion, music festivals tend to be less 
connected with these modes of legitimation.  Instead, such events craft a particular, 
internationally approved face of the monarchy and its institutional policies.   
Mawazine is the largest festival in the country and receives most of its financial backing 
directly from King Muhammad V (Mawazine 2015). The festival has grown into a transnational 
showcase of popular music highlighting the allegedly increased freedoms enjoyed by the 
Moroccan public in the wake of the 2011 constitutional reforms, and is a major source of income 
and recognition for up-and-coming popular music acts.  In this case, the regime’s legitimacy is 
less tied to ideas about religious tradition than to its image as a tolerant, democratic 
governmental system.  A page on the event’s official English-language website titled “Impact on 
Morocco’s Image” claims that “Mawazine … strives to convey the Moroccan cultural model 
abroad, while working to spread the values the kingdom embraces: tolerance, exchange and 
diversity.”  This echoes statements by the regime post-Casablanca 2003 that position Morocco as 
a religiously moderate and internationally receptive nation, often juxtaposed against an implicitly 
acknowledged background of Western anxiety over perceived terrorist threats. Mawazine and 
other, similar music festivals are often depicted as a vehicle for state cooptation that works to 
paint Moroccan society as an open and tolerant one.  This in turn discredits internal claims of 
state oppression.    
In recent years Mawazine’s global musical appeal has broadened.   Since 2012, the 
festival has featured internationally recognized acts such as Rihanna, Shakira, and the Miami-
based hip hop artist Pitbull. The event boasted over two million spectators last year alone.  The 
2014 festival, occurring in late May and early June of this year, featured the widely recognized 
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American artist Justin Timberlake as its opening act (Vivarelli 2014).  For Moroccans, 
Mawazine receives mixed reviews: it has been the subject of protests focusing on its perceived 
economic irresponsibility and its misrepresentation of Moroccan citizens’ expressive freedom.  
Yet the financial success of the festival and its importance for Moroccan musicians hoping to 
break into the international market make it a significant musical and cultural affair. Many 
emerging popular artists have performed in its smaller exhibitions as a way to gain access to 
larger concert venues, despite accusations of regime cooptation.  (Almeida 2013, 321–322).     
Large-scale events under the auspices of the regime are not the only source of 
contemporary festival culture.  Music and other forms of popular expression remain an important 
part of the 20M’s public outreach and have allowed for the creation of a festival subculture 
removed from the constraints of the formal patronage system and thus viewed as removed from 
regime interaction more generally.  This is in keeping with the previous discussion of critical 
citizenship in that it eschews direct governmental involvement through the traditional institutions 
of royal or Makhzen patronage. The Festival de Résistance et d’Alternatives (FRA) is one of the 
largest such nonprofit events with loose ties to 20M.  The group’s mission statement, printed in 
both English and Arabic on the organization’s Facebook page and official website, states  
The Festival of Resistance and Alternatives (FRA) offers a place dedicated to 
innovation, exchange and participation, where every individual can express 
themselves freely [sic]. The festival is an independent Moroccan initiative to 
create a space where people share their ideas, their principles, their talents and 
their artistic creations about sociocultural subjects such as economy, politics, art, 
education and others.   
  
The festival debuted on February 17, 2012 to coincide with the first anniversary of the 
20M’s largest protests, and has since occurred every year in mid-February.  It features theater 
and music workshops, photography exhibitions, documentary screenings, and other events 
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focused on community engagement and education.  The FRA’s website refrains from mentioning 
any specific artists in connection with the events, instead describing organizers and participants 
as “Moroccan artists and activists, some of whom are part of a social movement, while others are 
independent.”  This description resonates with the movement more generally in its depiction of 
semi-independent actors rather than a more homogenous organization with clear leadership and 
shared sociopolitical goals.   
MC Soultana, ‘New Feminism,’ and the Question of Oppositional Expression 
 Though some musicians openly associate with 20M and anti-regime protest through the 
FRA and other communities, most Moroccan rappers remain less clearly affiliated in the political 
arena. Accusations of regime cooptation at the Mawazine festival have not stopped many young 
artists from performing at the event.  The 2014 lineup notably included a performance by 
Muslim, a rapper from Tangier whose early career was marked by open denunciation of the 
government’s restrictions on freedom of expression and marginalization of Morocco’s northern 
regions.  MC Soultana and her former band Tigresse Flow participated in the festival in 2008, 
winning Mawazine’s Key Award for amateur artists despite the ensemble’s rather subversive 
position as an all-female rap group performing in both a genre and a space typically gendered as 
masculine. Since leaving Tigresse Flow for a solo career in 2010, Soultana has cultivated an 
even more politically conscious public image. Her most popular single, “Sawt Nissa” (Voice of 
Women), was released in 2011.  The song openly critiques the patriarchal family structure 
supported by Morocco’s legal and social institutions, and calls for women to more openly 
express their discontent and desire for change through a discussion of personal lived experience.   
Like many hip hop artists in Morocco, she does not address the sonic content of her 
music outright, but nor does she engage in the politics of authenticity that mark some other 
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musician’s discussions of their work.  Soultana’s home city of Casablanca is known for its 
“harder” musical and lyrical styling and beat tracks that draw strong influence from the broadly 
defined genre of Francophone electronic dance music (EDM) (Salois 2009).  MC Soultana’s 
work reflects this overarching musical characterization.  “Sawt Nissa” is entirely rapped, without 
the sung choruses or instrumental introductions that mark the earlier work of musicians and 
ensembles from Marrakesh, where hip hop tends to draw more influence from other Moroccan 
musical forms.  In this sense, “Sawt Nissa” can be heard as possessing a less regionally distinct 
sound as it lacks some of the clear regional sonic identifiers heard in “Ma Tqich Bladi” or 
Fnaire’s other output.  Allusions to the soundscape of Nass el-Ghiwane are quite markedly 
absent here.   
It is also worth noting that MC Soultana lacks the institutional support of more 
established groups like Fnaire.  As such, her music is less polished by high-end studio 
production.  English-language comments on some of her online music videos remark on the “lo-
fi” quality of her musical output.  In the American context, this lack of studio involvement often 
indexes “grassroots” credibility of an artist allegedly uncorrupted by the politics of state and 
studio involvement. This is especially true of musicians in contexts such as Morocco, where 
many mainstream forms of music production and distribution are directly or indirectly funded by 
state agencies (Salois 2009).  Whether Moroccan audiences have similar reactions to Soultana’s 
self-produced sound and musical aesthetic requires more in-depth fieldwork and remains a point 
of interest for future scholarship.  
Soultana delivers her lyrics at a high volume and in a highly punctuated style, placing 
rhythmic emphasis on consonant sounds rather than vowels.  The combination of strong diction 
and lack of melodic complexity draws most of the listener’s attention to the song’s lyrics, and in 
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interviews Soultana most openly addresses the lyrical content. Given this significant attention, 
her stylistic and musical choices seem like intentional ones.  For example, the chorus clearly 
declares 
This is the Moroccan woman, this is one of a million 
Woman’s voice that I’m calling 
Girl’s voice that is lost in my country 
The voice of those who wanna talk, who wanna say 
A voice for all the women who want a sign
19
 
 
 Here Soultana positions herself as an ally of economically and socially disenfranchised women 
through criticism of social discrimination, implying that the Moroccan state has failed to achieve 
gender equality in either public or private space. “Sawt Nissa” addresses the issues of domestic 
violence and prostitution, and shifts the impetus of these concerns from male-dominated social 
and legal spheres such as family and personal status law reform into women’s private lives and 
perspectives.  In much of the discourse surrounding state-engaged feminism and the government, 
continued legal and economic reform are positioned as central to improving gender relations and 
issues of inequality.  These institutional structures are undoubtedly important to many Moroccan 
women, especially in light of recent political and legal changes.  However, one major criticism 
presented against this mode of feminist thought has been that it excludes personal individual 
experience as a mode of political engagement (Salime 2014, 16).  Soultana’s lyrics expand 
feminist considerations to the “voice of women” and the depiction of daily experiences of 
gendered discrimination. 
 This claiming of individual experience and personal revolution resonates across both 
musical and social lines.  Since 2011, radical feminist organizations throughout North Africa 
have encouraged political and oppositional expression via women’s “microrebellious bodies” 
(Salime 2014, 15). Beginning with the Ukrainian-based radical feminist group Femen and the 
                                                          
19
 For a translation of all Darija lyrics in “Sawt Nissa,” see World Hip Hop Market 2012. 
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Moroccan organization Woman Choufouch, women have been using their physical presence in 
male public and social spaces as a form of highly individualized and localized sociopolitical 
expression.  In the case of Femen and Woman Choufouch, this often comes in the form of street 
and internet protests centering on the naked female body.  Salime argues that by deliberately 
placing the female body on public display and within the purview of the male gaze, these 
individual protestors not only desexualize their physical identities, but also begin to rework the 
gendered power structure embedded in the dichotomy of public and private space by transferring 
the shame associated with female sexuality to the shame associated with its visual consumption 
by a male audience. In this way, the women participating in these protests reclaim some of the 
power associated with their physical identities (Salime 2013, 16).  As this form of opposition is 
located in the individual via the clearly bounded physical body, it marks a distinct break from 
regime-approved modes of feminist protest that typically utilize rhetoric of the state and the 
community, rather than that of individual lived experience. 
Woman Choufouch and Femen remain on the fringes of Moroccan feminism and I do not 
wish to suggest that MC Soultana has been directly influenced by the either organization.  
However, “Sawt Nissa” and the oppositional activities of Woman Choufouch and Femen speak 
to an overall shift in the way that Moroccan feminism is broadly conceived.  In both instances 
the locus of expression lies not in formal state-controlled discourse but in the bodies and voices 
of individuals.  The complete lyrics of “Sawt Nissa” present the story of a female prostitute from 
the perspective of her friend (Soultana) who expresses disgust, not at the woman in question, but 
at the men and male-dominated social institutions that control and abuse her: 
She saw in your face the life she lost 
You looked at her like a cheap thing 
She saw in your face what she wanted to be 
You looked at her, a look of humiliation 
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She’s selling her body ‘cause you are the buyer 
And when she’s walking by you act like a Muslim. 
 
The song’s second verse engages directly with the male public and decries the hypocrisy of the 
condemnation of many impoverished women by those benefiting from the power structures that 
fuel and reinforce this social inequality.  Unlike Fnaire’s political response to Casablanca in 
2003, Soultana invokes religion not as an apolitical source of national pride and protection, but 
as a highly politicized social tool.  The line, “and when she’s walking by you act like a Muslim,” 
implies that the individuals in question are adopting a façade of piety.  This is highlighted by the 
preceding line which implicates them as not only participants in, but the root cause of the 
behavior they condemn.  
 “Sawt Nissa” contains multiple overt references to Islam, the most powerful of which 
occur in the song’s last verse: 
All of you know what I’m talking about 
Tell me how many mosques were built on ruins 
How many Muslim (sic) were a terrorist, a thief … 
How many girls lived the night as a hooker 
How many girls went back and now are a good mom (sic) 
And you are one of them don’t forget 
A rose is still a rose.      
 
This verse can be read in at least two ways.  One continues Soultana’s condemnation of 
hypocrisy within politico-religious institutions voiced in previous lines.  Her statement that 
mosques are built on ruins or that Muslims were terrorists and thieves can be seen to reinforce 
the idea that Islamic language in the political sphere often covers dysfunctional or sexist 
institutional frameworks.  The ruins beneath mosques do not provide adequate support for either 
the buildings or the larger social institutions they represent and, much like the Muslim men 
soliciting prostitution mentioned earlier in the song, the terrorists and thieves here could be seen 
as similarly hypocritical. 
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However, the religious imagery appeals directly to women and encourages a more 
optimistic understanding of the lyrics.  The word “you” (anti) in the penultimate line takes a 
feminine Arabic ending.  Viewed in this light mosques built on ruins or the faithful turning from 
a life of crime and violence, mobilize Islam as a tool for the socially and politically 
disenfranchised.  This marks a considerable shift away from the religiously-informed discourse 
surrounding feminist efforts of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  As discussed in chapter one, the 
monarch’s role as Commander of the Faithful religiously sanctions state patriarchy and renders 
Islam and Islamic discourse relatively powerless in terms of state engagement.  MC Soultana 
does not directly engage with the regime or regime discourse and so creates an expressive space 
in which Islam retains its political accessibility as a tool of individual empowerment.   
Considered in this light, Soultana’s work represents the emergence of a new type of 
feminist opposition and musical political interaction.  “Sawt Nissa” depicts Moroccan women as 
active agents, rather than disembodied symbols.  Soultana lyrically embraces her gendered 
perspective and frames herself as a woman openly expressing shared stories of struggle and 
discrimination.  Even her stage name denotes a conscious feminine identity by adding a feminine 
ending to the typically masculine Arabic word sulṭān. In a 2011 interview with the online music 
magazine World Hip Hop Market, she described the difficulties faced by female rappers: 
“Women in this rap game were, and are still struggling because it’s a hard thing to do.  It’s 
especially hard when you’re compelled to spit rhymes about tough subjects like mental and 
physical abuse, violence, rape … subjects that men personally know little to nothing about.”  By 
voicing these contentious issues in a highly public space Soultana challenges notions that 
feminist concerns can be discussed and resolved only within female-gendered spheres of 
interaction or only under the auspices of the regime’s patriarchal protection and control.  Her 
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public persona and widespread popularity help move questions of women’s rights and social 
inequality into more male-dominated zones of attention. 
Other elements of Soultana’s music and career deny such easy categorization and indicate 
that, while her work embodies a shift in women’s accepted social and political roles, this debate 
is far from settled.  Lyrically, “Sawt Nissa” contains repeated references to motherhood. One line 
intones, “Look at her like your mother, like your sister,” while another asks, “How many girls 
[prostitutes] went back [home] and now are a good mom?”  This linking of women’s individual 
worth with their familial status echoes previous discussions of women’s rights that hinged on 
marital and motherly duties rather than personal agency.   “Sawt Nissa” appeals to listeners to 
respect the women in question because of their family roles, not necessarily because their status 
as rights-bearing citizens warrants it.  I am not suggesting that MC Soultana has failed in her 
feminist cause.  Music provides an expressive space for sociopolitical value systems to be 
explored, contested, and perhaps altered.  In this sense, “Sawt Nissa” represents the ongoing 
contestation of the meanings of feminism, opposition, and women’s citizenship rather than a 
complete snapshot of contemporary Moroccan feminism in its concrete form.   
MC Soultana’s political affiliations off stage also reinforce the contested nature of hip 
hop and oppositional expression.  Interviews with her appear on many English-language 
websites concerned with feminist and other alternative forms of hip hop, and one of her more 
recent conversations with Mary Stuckey of Public Radio International (PRI) highlights her 
ambivalent relationship with Moroccan politics and the monarchy.  In the on-air interview she 
states, “We [Moroccans] don’t need a revolution. We just need a solution to the problems.”  
Rather than speak out directly against the king, Soultana strategically separates the need for a 
(democratic) revolution and the potential to solve the nation’s social and political crises.  In this 
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sense, Soultana’s public persona can be understood as operating within the discursive framework 
of self-censorship encouraged by the Moroccan regime’s semi-authoritarian system and complex 
of approved and unapproved speech acts.  In 2003, Fnaire expressed their position within this 
system via the musical discourse of authenticity and piety.  Soultana does not directly engage in 
the same politics of authenticity or public respectability, but her reluctance to implicate the 
regime directly in the nation’s perceived struggles echoes some of Fnaire’s statements on-screen 
in I Love Hip Hop Morocco.   
Soultana does not position herself as anti-monarchy, but nor does she embrace the openly 
pro-monarchy stance taken by groups such as Fnaire.  Instead, she operates within the 
restrictions of monarchical compliance, utilizing the global platform provided by the Mawazine 
festival and other venues to carve out a space for musical and social expression, albeit within 
limits.  Much like the “critical citizenship” espoused by the 20M and its proponents, Soultana’s 
lack of direct interaction with the monarchy may actually allow her greater expressive freedom 
as her music remains relatively unhindered by the boundaries of regime-approved discourse.  
Summary: A Contemporary Understanding of Hip Hop and Moroccan Feminist Resistance 
 
 The social movement that began in February of 2011 has illustrated large-scale changes 
in the understandings of feminism and opposition in Morocco.  Whereas previous modes of 
resistance engaged with the regime and the king through conduits of legal discourse, the 20M 
moves their calls for action away from these highly controlled governmental spheres into public 
social spaces.  In so doing, contemporary activists also necessitate a reexamination of feminism 
and its role in current struggles for social justice.  By relying on physical gender parity in the 
movement rather than the state-engaged legal reform sought by earlier feminist groups, the 20M 
alters perceptions of citizenship as dominated by men’s actions and women’s passivity to a 
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political status rooted in individual agency.  However, the movement’s far-flung net of 
involvement complicates this discourse.  Because they claim no unifying ideology, the 20M and 
its approach to feminist issues such as educational, legal, and economic inequality provided the 
regime with a relatively easy target for cooptation and disempowerment (Molina 2011, 438).   
 An examination of the expressive musical culture surrounding the 20M and subsequent 
protests allows for a deeper understanding of the contradictions embedded in the movement, as 
well as the ways that individual political actors work around and within regime structures.  MC 
Soultana’s musical work exists at this nexus of contemporary feminist opposition and regime 
control.  On one hand, “Sawt Nissa” can be understood within the framework of Salime’s new 
feminism.  Soultana is breaking with previous notions of feminist expression by embracing her 
gendered identity and speaking publicly about women’s issues from an insider’s perspective.  On 
the other hand, her depiction of women’s rights as tied to familial status, as well as her continued 
participation in state-sponsored festival events highlights her rather ambivalent relationship with 
the opposition. 
I believe that neither MC Soultana nor the 20M more generally represent a dismissal of 
feminism and issues of gender equality in contemporary Moroccan politics or protest culture.  
Rather, the contradictions apparent in emerging modes of opposition indicate an ongoing 
contestation of feminism and citizenship whose final result is yet to be determined.  By 
examining music and other expressive media in light of these debates a clearer picture of 
Moroccan protest culture emerges, one that does not rely on the limiting binary framework of 
genuine oppositional expression versus commercialized regime cooptation, but attempts to see 
both artists and activists as individual agents engaged in highly personal struggles for legitimacy 
and recognition.   
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Conclusion 
 There is clearly still work to be done in exploring the intersections between regime 
legitimacy, feminist opposition, and emerging hip hop artists in Morocco.  A deeper 
understanding of the history and construction of gendered social spaces and the Kingdom’s use 
of religious rhetoric as a mode of legitimation through the Mudawwana and its reforms provides 
a strong starting point for examining the continued evolution of Moroccan feminist engagement.  
By including hip hop and the hip hop community as another possible conduit for analysis, the 
preceding pages have hopefully worked to broaden the discourse surrounding Moroccan protest 
culture and feminism beyond the scope of grassroots popular discontent and regime cooptation to 
include music’s role in both reinforcing and subverting the organization of gendered social space 
and roles in contemporary Morocco.  Invoking the perspective of Stuart Hall in which popular 
culture is understood as a space where social power structures are explored and contested allows 
for a more nuanced depiction of musicians, their works, and the sociopolitical environment in 
which they are embedded.    
Temporally separated by nearly a decade and hailing from two distinct stylistic 
communities, it is not surprising that the musical and lyrical content of “Sawt Nissa” and “Ma 
Tqich Bladi” are highly distinctive.  But where these differences are most apparent provides a 
telling look at developments in both feminist thought and the political environment more 
generally.  “Ma Tqich Bladi” evokes the symbolically potent khamsa to engage directly with 
regime rhetoric in which women serve as national culture bearers under the auspices of divinely 
inspired monarchical protection.  The ensemble employs the language of Islam as an apolitical 
designation of nationhood and a symbolic barrier against external threats of violence.  Fnaire 
speaks of women but does not include their voices or bodies in either their song or its 
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accompanying music video.  MC Soultana, by contrast, reflects the 20M’s calls for political 
action disengaged from official regime channels, and the general movement of women into male-
dominated social spaces occurring since the Mudawwana’s official abolition in 2010.  She raps 
publicly about gendered concerns from a position of experience and no longer depicts women as 
passive national symbols, but as active citizens of the nation. 
 This, however, is only half the story.  The spaces between these musicians’ discourse and 
actions remain a potentially rich field of investigation.  As discussed in chapters two and three, 
Fnaire and MC Soultana engage in activities that can be seen as both confirming and denying 
regime legitimacy.  In the case of Fnaire, the group’s pro-monarchy stance is complicated by 
their widely publicized participation in musical and social spheres removed from the control of 
royal or Makhzen patronage, as well as their encouragement of burgeoning talent in these 
unconventional independent arenas.  Their references to Nass el-Ghiwane, both in their musical 
output and in their musical discourse, also deny a straightforward reading of their political 
leanings.   
While “Sawt Nissa” is portrayed as a highly critical, even revolutionary song by many 
international musicians and critics, MC Soultana continues to openly participate in large-scale 
festival events such as Mawazine.  These events work to reaffirm regime legitimacy and control 
of public speech through patronage and the creation of international spectacle.  Soultana also 
echoes common rhetoric in which women’s value as individuals resides in their roles as mothers 
and daughters.  Even in “Sawt Nissa,” she asks for respect not through evocation of women’s 
inherent human worth, but because a marginalized woman could be a listener’s sister, mother, or 
daughter.  The nation becomes a metaphor for the family, wherein women’s social value is 
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located entirely in the domestic sphere and, in the case of women’s roles as wives, in their 
relationships with men.   
The complicated intersections between Fnaire and MC Soultana’s artistic output, 
personas, and public actions do not necessarily implicate them in regime oppression or political 
opportunism.  Instead, these discrepancies demonstrate both the contested nature of sonic space 
and the shifting nexus of individual agency, socio-musical expression, and external political 
pressure in contemporary Moroccan hip hop.  It has not been my intent to claim that any one 
musical perspective is more ethically informed or oppositionally engaged than others.  To do so 
would be to reify what is a continually shifting arena between contestation and consent, and to 
deny the multifaceted concerns and perspectives of individual musicians.  Instead, I hope to have 
contributed to the conversation begun by Kendra Renee Salois, Cristina Moreno Almeida, Zakia 
Salime, and Samia Errazouki who view both hip hop communities and protest culture as 
dynamic systems, defying simplistic qualifications as indicators of democratic success modelled 
on the United States or the European Union, or of often essentialized monarchical cooptation. 
The most recent political uprisings in Morocco and throughout the Maghreb are far from 
resolved, and the impacts of contemporary gendered political opposition have yet to be seen.  
Continued engagement with Moroccan hip hop musicians and communities may help scholars 
from both Morocco and elsewhere to remain mindful of the nuanced perspectives of musicians 
and listeners, and to avoid limiting or essentializing frameworks that rely on dichotomous 
depictions of political actors and their opponents.  Music provides an expressive space free of 
some of the constraints present in other media.  At the same time, the multivalent nature of hip 
hop’s musical, lyrical, and visual content opens up the possibility for multiple and contradictory 
readings.  When placed in dialogue with the sociopolitical environment in which musicians live, 
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work, and perform, these understandings do not necessarily point to clear answers to questions of 
the nation’s political or social outlook.  To the contrary, the complex expressions by hip hop 
artists and their fans begs a reevaluation of both protest culture as broadly conceived and the 
ways that it is informed by individuals’ gendered subjectivities and actions to shape a nation’s 
future. 
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